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5.1 Introduction
One can distinguish pension systems along three dimensions (see Lind-
beck and Persson [2003]): defined benefit versus defined contribution,
funded versus pay as you go, and actuarial versus nonactuarial. The first
dimension involves intergenerational risk sharing: how are macroeco-
nomic risks distributed over various generations? In particular, in de-
fined-benefit systems, the retired generations are shielded from macro-
economic risks. In defined-contribution systems, in contrast, these
generations are bearing some of the investment risk. The second dimen-
sion relates to intergenerational redistribution: are there predictable
transfers from the young, working generations to the retired genera-
tions? The third dimension, finally, involves the link between contribu-
tions and benefits on an individual level. A system is actuarially fair if
the individual premium paid corresponds to the actuarial value of the
additional pension benefits that are being accumulated.
This paper explores the first two dimensions of an optimal pension
system. In exploring optimal pension systems, we distinguish between
predictable intergenerational transfers and optimal risk sharing. Hence,
in contrast to Merton (1983) and Krueger and Kubler (2002,2005), we al-
low the government to enhance intergenerational risk sharing without
necessarily implementing a pay-as-you-go system. Indeed, defined ben-
efit-funded pension systems that link benefits to wage rates and absorb
financial market shocks by adjusting pension premia paid by the young
can help to trade risks between the young, who are long on human cap-
ital and the older generation, who are long on financial capital. In con-
trast to defined-benefit pay-as-you-go systems, these funded systems
enhance risk sharing without crowding out capital formation. We ana-
lyze the optimal mix between defined-benefit and defined-contribution242 Bovenberg and Uhlig
pensions as part of the optimal risk-sharing scheme, while at the same
time determining the optimal mix between funded and pay-as-you-go
financing as part of the optimal redistribution between old, young, and
future generations.
To investigate optimal intergenerational redistribution and optimal
intergenerational risk sharing in a general equilibrium setting, we de-
velop a stochastic overlapping-generations model of a closed economy
featuring endogenous growth. Optimal risk sharing under an ex ante
welfare criterion has been explored in a partial-equilibrium setting by
Gordon and Varian (1988), Shiller (1999), and De Menil, Murtin, and
Sheshinski (2005). Our analysis builds on the general equilibrium model
of Bohn (1998,1999, 2003, 2005), who investigates optimal risk sharing
under an ex ante welfare criterion between overlapping generations in
an exogenous growth model with capital accumulation. Regarding re-
lated contributions on this issue, see also Olovsson (2004) for optimal
risk sharing under an ex post criterion, see Blanchard and Weil (2001),
Demange (2002), and Barbie, Hagedorn, and Kaul (2003,2004), while for
the role of agent heterogeneity, see, for example, Conesa and Krueger
(1999). We extend Bonn's analysis by incorporating endogenous growth
so that we can also explore the optimal response of long-term growth to
various productivity and demographic shocks. Moreover, we integrate
various elements that Bohn has studied in separate papers, such as en-
dogenous labor supply (see Bohn [1998]), productivity shocks (in labor
productivity, factor productivity, and depreciation, see Bohn [1998]) and
demographic shocks (fertility and longevity, see Bohn [1999]). We also
explore how government transfers between generations should opti-
mally respond to various shocks and clearly distinguish between pre-
dictable intergenerational transfers and optimal risk sharing.
Key to studying issues of risk sharing is the issue of risk aversion. For
that reason, we pay particular attention to the distinction between in-
tertemporal substitution and risk aversion as formulated by Epstein and
Zin (1989) or Weil (1990). In fact, as in Bohn (1998), we also allow for risk
aversion of the young agents, which one may either read as a desire of
the social planner toward insuring the yet-unborn, or life-risk aversion
of young agents before they are able to participate in market activities.
The life-risk aversion parameter will play a crucial role.
As in the classic overlapping-generations model of Diamond (1965),
at any point in time two generations are alive. Only the older generation
participates in the capital market and is thus subject to capital-market
risks. The younger generation works and is subject to labor-incomePension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 243
risks. These two overlapping generations cannot trade risks in the capi-
tal market because the young cannot participate in the capital market be-
fore the shocks occur and thus cannot insure against the realization of
uncertainty at their birth. An alternative interpretation is that the young
cannot borrow against their human capital to invest in the capital mar-
ket. The young, who are long on human capital, and the old, who are
long on physical capital, thus have to rely on government intervention
to trade and diversify risks. To illustrate: through the pension system,
the government, in effect can create new, nontradable assets that are not
traded in financial markets and give the old a claim on labor income and
the young a claim on capital income. By endowing the various genera-
tions with net positions in these assets, the government can, in principle,
create an insurance equilibrium that would emerge if agents could
freely trade ex ante. The government can trade not only risks between
these two overlapping generations but also shift risks between current
generations and future generations through capital accumulation. In
this way, the government can also engineer implicit trades between
nonoverlapping generations. We thus consider risk sharing both within
periods between overlapping generations and across time between
nonoverlapping generations.
We consider a social planning problem and characterize some neces-
sary properties of optimal risk sharing arrangements across genera-
tions. Our economy features three imperfections calling for government
intervention. First, the endogenous growth feature implies an external-
ity in capital formation, which calls for an investment subsidy. Second,
the intergenerational distribution may not be optimal from the point of
view of a social planner, who thus may want to engage in intergenera-
tional redistribution. Third, ex ante trading in risks between generations
is not possible because generations can participate in capital markets
only after they are born and most shocks have already materialized.
Shifting risks to the groups who can best bear them can thus create an ex
ante Pareto improvement and maintains incentives for risk-taking in
general equilibrium. Improved risk sharing generates a Pareto im-
provement only in an ex ante, not an ex post sense. Indeed, thinking
about risk sharing before shocks actually hit helps to avoid divisive
battles about intergenerational redistribution after the shocks have in
fact materialized.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After section 5.2 formu-
lates the model, section 5.3 sets up the social planners' problem and in-
terprets the conditions for optimal intergenerational risk sharing. Sec-244 Bovenberg and Uhlig
tion 5.4 solves the social planners' problem. It investigates the solution
to the steady state, showing the calculation of the equilibrium boils
down to solving one equation in labor supply. For the dynamics, it relies
on using log-linearization techniques rather than projection algorithms,
as in Krueger and Kubler (2004), in order to derive insights into the lin-
earized behavior around the steady state. In particular, it is shown that
the dynamics of the model are characterized by a single endogenous-
state vector, which combines ex ante utilities as well as the current cap-
ital stock. We thus provide a flexible framework that can be used and cal-
ibrated as a workhorse for exploring intergenerational risk sharing with
endogenous growth. Section 5.5 explores how the social optimum can
be decentralized through a pension system. Section 5.6 provides some
quantitative explorations of the model and investigates the factors de-
termining optimal intergenerational distribution and risk sharing. Sec-
tion 5.7 concludes.
We obtain the following key results.
1. We provide a general characterization of the optimal risk-sharing
condition; see, in particular, propositions 1, 2, and 3. A detailed inter-
pretation is provided subsequent to proposition 3.
2. An endogenous growth model is provided, which is fairly tractable,
despite featuring endogenous labor supply, a number of different
shocks, and nonseparable preferences. In passing, we provide the con-
ditions necessary for balanced growth under Epstein-Zin preferences
(see section 5.3.2 and appendix A.2). In special cases, it is possible to
characterize the steady state completely, while it generally requires solv-
ing a one-dimensional equation characterizing steady-state labor
supply (see section 4 and in particular equation [62] and appendices
A.4.5andA.4.7).
3. We use log-linearization techniques to characterize the response to
shocks (see propositions 2 and 3 as well as appendices 5.A.I and
5.A.4.8), including implications for risk premia (see Appendix 5.A.3). It
should be understood that this is a small-shock approximation, or an ap-
proximation to shocks with bounded support (see Samuelson [1970] and
the discussion in Judd and Guu [2001]). Despite the limitations of log-
linear approximations, this provides a useful starting point for further
explorations of risk sharing with higher-order numerical techniques—
or, alternatively, for searching for interesting special cases, which can be
solved analytically.Pension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 245
4. The endogenous dynamics can be shown to solve a third-degree
polynomial in a single-state variable, with typically only one stationary
solution. This is explicitly shown in Appendix 5.A.5. Thus, the model is
suitable for exploring a rich set of features while keeping the amount of
analytics moderate, providing a starting point and intuition for models
featuring a larger number of periods of life.
5. A number of interesting insights emerge from the quantitative ex-
ploration of the model (see section 5.6). The usual caveat, that these
statements are strictly valid only for the parameter ranges investigated
(and should not be read as globally valid theorems) applies.
a. At a benchmark parameterization, the old bear a smaller burden
of the risk in productivity surprises, if old-age risk aversion is larger
than life risk aversion, but a larger one, if the old-age risk aversion is
smaller (see equation [53] and section 5.6.5). Thus, whether young
agents should insure the old agents against the random returns on
stock markets due to the uncertainty in technological progress de-
pends on how one views the risk aversion of old people versus the de-
sire to insure the yet-unborn against their life risk. Note how a fully
funded defined-contribution system, where the old save for retire-
ment by holding equity, would lead to an equal sharing of the pro-
ductivity risk between young and old in the case of full depreciation,
while a defined-benefit system would impose the entire risk on the
young. Neither solution is typically optimal from a social planner's
perspective, although the defined-contribution private capital sys-
tem seems to be optimal in some special circumstances with respect
to productivity shocks that equally affect labor and capital income.
b. Consumption of the young and the old always moves in the same
direction, even for a population growth shock, where the size of the
new young generation is larger than expected (see section 5.6.6). This
result is in contrast to the result of a fully funded decentralized sys-
tem without risk sharing between generations: there, the old would
receive higher consumption (due to the increase in return to capital),
while the young would receive lower consumption (due to decreas-
ing marginal returns in labor from the larger working population).
c. Persistent increases in longevity will lead to lower total consump-
tion of the old (and thus certainly lower per-period consumption of
the old) and the young as well as higher work effort of the young. The
additional resources are used to increase growth and future output,246 Bovenberg and Uhlig
resulting in higher consumption of future generations (see section
5.6.7). Thus, increases in life expectancy require old agents not only
to get by with less per period but also with less in total, in contrast to
what a defined-benefit system or standard insurance contracts might
offer.
5.2 The Model
5.2.1 Motivation and Overview
We provide a model in which the key features can be studied while re-
maining tractable. As a starting point, we follow Yanagawa and Uhlig
(1996) and construct an overlapping-generations model with capital
and endogenous growth, effectively delivering an AK model. This elim-
inates capital as a state variable, thus simplifying the analysis. Since we
want to study both risk aversion and intertemporal substitution, we
keep them separate, using Epstein-Zin preferences. As sources of risks,
we allow for variations in factor productivities, depreciation, longevity,
and population growth.
5.2.2 The Environment
Consider a discrete time overlapping-generations model with t = 1,2,
... in which all agents live for two periods and where random shocks oc-
cur at the beginning of each period. For convenience, tables 5.1 and 5.2
summarize the symbols. Let ct , ct+10 denote the per capita consumption
of the representative agent born at the beginning of period t when young
and when old, respectively. Agents work only during the first period of
their lives. The labor supply of the generation born in period t is denoted
by nr The fraction of the second period during which the old are actu-
ally alive to enjoy consumption is denoted by Tsjt+V An exogenous vari-
able, tu(+1, is known at the beginning of period f + 1. It measures the re-
maining expected lifetime of the old, given the medical and
demographic knowledge at the beginning of period t + 1. We define
ct+10 as total consumption of the old in the second period, so that ct+1 J
trrt+1 represents consumption of the old per unit of time. Given some util-
ity q(-) for old-age consumption per unit of time, total utility when old is
(1)Table 5.1.
Summary table for the notation and symbols used in this paper, part 1.
Notation
A
c>,v
~
c>.
r
^t + lfi
ct0
d,
/(•)
3C
h,
KM
if
SR,
LJ(-)
"(•/)
Ut(ht)
u,,0
x(-)
Yt
y,
z,
Meaning
total factor productivity
argument of z(-).
aggregate cons, of young at t
cons, of gen. born in t, when young
rescaled consumption
aggregate cons, of old at t
cons, of gen. born in t, when old
rescaled consumption
discounting correction
production function
set of all possib. histories at t
set of all possible histories
history up to t
aggr. capital, used in prod, at t
capital in prod, at t, per old
logarithm, deriv. of u w.r.t. c
logarithm, deriv. of u w.r.t. n
logarithm, deriv. of x
logarithm, deriv. of q
logarithm, deriv. of v
discount factor of soc. plan.
labor supply of gen. born in t, when young
utility function when old
social rate of return
state space for date-t-variables
Sharpe ratio
overall utility
overall utility of generation t, cond. on f-info
instantaneous utility when young
parameter for initially old
ex post utility
ex ante expected utility at beginning of time
risk-aversion transformation
aggregate output at t
output at t, per old
overall ex ante risk-aversion function
labor-specific productivity t
First occurance
(7)
(28)
(9)
(2)
below definition 5
(9)
(2)
below definition 5
(20)
(7)
below (11)
below (11)
(11)
(7)
(8)
above (31)
above (31)
above (31)
above (31)
(43)
(23)
(2)
(2)
(24)
below (10)
(98)
(2)
(2)
(2)
(5)
below definition 1
(12)
(2)
(7)
(8)
(2)
(7)Table 5.2.
Summary table for the notation and symbols used in this paper, part 2.
Notation
at
P
X
8,
^,,
M-..«,»
Mw
»V
-
e
-
*(•)
7,
•n
i
K(nf)
K
\
V
n,
°y
T',v
Tf,pr>v
T(,pub
ft),
OJ
P
9
T!J(
S
t,
Meaning
argument share
discount factor of agent
pref. parameter for leisure
depreciation rate
(negative) elasticity of z'(-)
(negative) elasticity of uc (•,•) w.r.t. c
(negative) elasticity of uc (•,•) w.r.t. n
(negative) elasticity of x'(-)
(negative) elasticity of q'(-)
scale factor
allocation
rescaled allocation
extra (policy) shock
inverse of intertemp. elast. of subst.
X"
1
integration constant
integration constant
Lagrange multiplicator on feasibility
risk avers, w.r.t. old-age risk
young population
young population growth factor
income share
return subsidy
lump-sum tax on young
lump-sum tax on old
tax, if priv. cap.
tax, if publ. cap.
life time risk-aversion parameter
welfare weight
welfare weight factor
correlation
production function param.
production function param.
expected lifetime of the old in period t
exponent of w
vector of exog. var.
First occurance
above (31)
(2)
(55)
(9)
above (31)
above (31)
above (31)
above (31)
above (31)
in definition 5
in definition 1
in definition 5
below (10)
above (40), (42)
just below (78)
(40)
below (40)
(14)
(44)
(6)
(6)
(88)
(69)
(68)
(69)
(70)
(71)
(44)
in definition 4
below definition 4
before (98)
(56)
(56)
(2)
(102)
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We wish to distinguish intertemporal elasticity of substitution from
risk aversion. We therefore use some concave and differentiable func-
tion x(-) to increase the curvature of Ut t+1 before taking expectations and
undoing this curvature again. Furthermore, we allow for risk aversion
to lifetime risk (or, alternatively, for a preference of the social planner to-
ward equality across generations). Overall preferences of the generation
born at the beginning of time t (conditional on the information that is
available during that period) are assumed to be given by
= z u{cty/ nt) + £x-n EA x\ wt+1q\ -^ , (3)
where u(-,-) is an instantaneous utility function in consumption and
work effort during the first period of life, and z(-), x(-), and q{-) are strictly
increasing and continuously differentiable functions such that Lf(-) is
strictly concave in ctyl nt and ct+l0.
As an important special case, consider
= (
!_£ ()
where £ 5:0 and v > r\ > 0 (see also equation [44]). This specification and
its consequences are discussed in greater detail in section 5.3.3.
For the generation that is old at the beginning of the planning pe-
riod, Uo 1 are the preferences at the start of period 1, (see equation [1]),
and
Uofi = z(u0 + px-MEoMUai)]}) (5)
= z
for some parameter u0 are the preferences of the initially old, when con-
sidering them ex ante, that is, behind the veil of ignorance before the un-
certainty about the first period is resolved. We have incorporated z(-)
and u0 as a normalization in order to compare utilities of the initially old
and agents living in two periods in the same units, when studying the
social planner's problem.
Let the population of the young at date t be Ht, and denote the growth
factor of the young population as250 Bovenberg and Uhlig
We use capital letters to denote aggregate variables, so that Cty =
Ilfcty/ and so on. With kt_lf we denote the capital stock available for pro- duction per old person at date t. Thus, Ktl = IIf_1fcf_1 represents the ag- gregate capital stock in period t.
The aggregate production function is given by
Yt = AtKt_J{Zpt), (7)
for some positive, concave, strictly increasing, and strictly concave
function/(•). Here, At stands for a total factor productivity parameter
and Zt represents a labor-specific productivity parameter. Aggregate
production Yt is proportional to the aggregate capital stock. We are thus
essentially assuming an AK model. Note that labor per young person,
nt, rather than aggregate labor, TLtnt, appears as an argument of the
function/(•). This aggregate-AK production function can arise from a
decentralized production economy with a production externality that
is proportional to the capital stock per young person, Kt_1/Ylt (see sec-
tion 5.5).
With yt, we denote aggregate production, divided by the population
of the old (i.e., yt =
yt = Atkt_J(Ztnt). (8)
Aggregate feasibility requires that
CttJf + Ctfi + Kt = Yl + (l-bt)Kt_1, (9)
where we allow for time variation in the depreciation rate 8r Expressed
relative to the older population, this equation reads (after substituting
[8] to eliminate yt)
V
7*
 +
 c*,o +
 k^t = (AJ(Ztnt) + 1 - 8,)fc,_r (10)
The vector (Zt, At, 5f, irt, rnt) e tf is stochastic and i.i.d., and where $f = 9t++; k0 and Il0 are given and nonrandom, and we normalize II0 = 1.
ht = [(Zt, At, 5f, ir(/ xnt),. . ., (Zlt Ax, 8X, ir^ TCT^] (11) denotes the history up to and including t. Let §€, = (ht I all ht) = 3"c di
5t
denote the set of all histories up to and including t and let W = uj°=1^t de-
note their union.
Let some initial level of capital k\ be given.Pension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 251
Definition 1 A feasible allocation is a mapping from the set of all histories
into a vector of positive real numbers, $: W —> $i
5+, such that fc_2 = k% and the
vector (cty,ct0,nt, kt) = <$>(ht) satisfies (10) for all histories ht e ffl.
Associated with a feasible allocation are ex post utilities Ut t = Ut(ht),
uOrl = UM.
5.3 The Social Planner's Problem
The social planner maximizes the utility of the agents (2) subject to the
feasibility constraint (10) given the exogenous stochastic process (Zt,At,
8(, TTt, vit). In this connection, one needs to take a stand on whether
agents born at the same time but with different histories are different
agents or not. If they are different, then insurance of young agents
against shocks during their period of birth (i.e., redistributing from
young agents born in good times to young agents born in bad times) will
typically not constitute a Pareto improvement. Indeed, this would be a
redistribution from good-state agents to bad-state agents.
Definition 2 [PO 1] A noninsurance Pareto optimum is a feasible alloca-
tion with associated ex post utilities Utt (i.e., [2]) and Uov see [1], such that no
other feasible allocation exists that attains equally large utilities for all histories
and generations and a strictly larger utility for at least one history and genera-
tion.
When contemplating insurance, the social planner compares states
with different population sizes. In particular, the social planner treats all
agents born at the same date and under the same history in the same
way and thus assigns the same weight per person across different states
of nature. Hence, the ex ante preferences of the social planner for gener-
ation t > 0 at the beginning of time amount to
utfi = E0(ntiy. (12)
The ex ante preferences of the social planner for the initial old are given
by Uoo, stated in (5) in view of our normalization Il0 = 1.
Definition 3 [PO 2] A Pareto optimum with insurance is a feasible allo-
cation with associated ex ante utilities Uoo (see [5] and Ut0[12]), such that no
other feasible allocation exists attaining equally large ex ante utilities for all
generations and strictly larger ex ante utility for at least one generation.252 Bovenberg and Uhlig
Clearly, any Pareto optimum with insurance is also a noninsurance
Pareto optimum, but not vice versa. As an example, suppose that in
some allocation A, a particular generation receives consumption c - (JL if
times are bad and c + |JL if times are good, for some |x > 0. Suppose that
bad times and good times are equally likely. Suppose finally that some
alternative allocation B exists, equivalent in all aspects, except that this
generation then receives consumption c in both eventualities. In view of
the concavity of the preferences, allocation A could not be a Pareto opti-
mum with insurance, since allocation B provides insurance ex ante.
However, allocation A might well be a noninsurance Pareto optimum,
since the generation born in good times is considered to be different
from the generation born in bad times. Thus, conditions necessary for a
noninsurance Pareto optimum are also necessary for a Pareto optimum
with insurance. Voluntary schemes can implement noninsurance Pareto
optima (see, e.g., Blanchard and Weil [2001] and Barbie, Hagedorn, and
Kaul [2003, 2004]). Insurance optima, in contrast, require compulsory
participation to commit generations to the ex post redistribution that is
implied by ex ante insurance.
Pareto optima with insurance are more interesting for our purposes
because the issue of intergenerational risk sharing among the yet un-
born is at the heart of our analysis. One should bear in mind, however,
that our analysis involves a choice regarding the welfare weights as-
signed to agents of the same period born under different histories: their
relative weights correspond to the relative probabilities of their specific
histories.
To provide a single objective for the social planner, we follow Bohn
(2003) in formulating a weighted sum of the ex ante utilities of the vari-
ous generations, with (a>()~=0 as a sequence of (nonstochastic) welfare
weights.
Definition 4 (SP) A social optimum for welfare weights (oot/)~=0 is a feasible
allocation solving
max X
wAo-
This social optimum implements a particular Pareto optimum with
insurance. Using equation (12), we can write the social objective func-
tion as
max
alloc.)
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To focus on stationary solutions, we implement exponential discount-
ing so that (3it — oo
f.
5.3.1 First-order Conditions
Consider the problem of finding a social optimum for welfare weights
o>f = o)'. Let w
fXt be the Lagrange multiplier on the aggregate feasibility
equation (9) so that n^w^, is the Lagrange multiplier on the feasibility
constraint (10). For ease of notation, assume that random variables can
only take one of finitely many values, each with positive probability
given any history. Let
 <Mt be the set of all histories up to and including t,
and let Prob(/zt) be its unconditional probability. The Lagrangian then
amounts to
(14)
We have made the dependence of only kt and Ut t on ht explicit. In fact,
the population, their growth rates, and all economic choices at date t,
like ct yorkt, are similarly functions of ht.
Dropping the argument ht, the first-order conditions are
(15)
(16)
(17)
A*/ <•> <o
dnt J
 t
 f
 f
 x
 l
 t dnt '
n \ + i - § li (18)
In equation (16) we have been a bit more formal than usual. A more gen-
eral treatment would involve treating this equation as an equality be-
tween measures or their Radon-Nikodym derivatives. The right-hand
side of that equation involves taking the derivative of a conditional ex-
pectation with respect to one of its arguments. To be more explicit (and254 Bovenberg and Uhlig
after cancellations of the conditional probability terms on both sides of
the equation), (16) can be rewritten as
\ = ~dJ—) <
19)
where
is a discounting correction due to the separation of intertemporal sub-
stitution and risk aversion as well as allowing for life-risk aversion: for
the definition of z' (a^), see equation (28).
Define wt to be the marginal social productivity per unit of labor:
Zt
The first and third first-order condition together imply
wt
dcty dnt
which is the familiar condition that the marginal rate of substitution be-
tween consumption and leisure should equal its social opportunity
costs, that is, the aggregate marginal rate of transformation.
Define the stochastic discount factor of the social planner as
ooX,,,
mt+1 = —^ (23)
and the social rate of return as
J (24)
We can then write the fourth first-order condition as a familiar asset-
price equation
1 = Et(mt+1Rt+l).
Substitute \t from (15), \t+1 from (19), and AJ(Ztnt) + 1 - 8f from (24) into (18) to obtain
L^V+1l (25)
or explicitlyPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 255
Equation (25) is the familiar asset-pricing equation in terms of marginal
utilities of generation t, adjusted with the discounting-correction term
dt+1 and longevity risk tuf+1.
5.3.2 Risk Sharing
The first two first-order conditions imply
XtProb(fct | ht_x) = ^ Prob(fct | ht_x) = - ^=^, (27) dctiy (o dct0
which is a risk-sharing or complete markets condition: young and old
agents alive at the same time should evaluate risk using the same sto-
chastic discount factor. Let at be the argument of the z(-)-function in the
specification of the utility function (2), that is,
(28
)
One can then write the risk-sharing condition (27) as follows.
PROPOSITION 1 [The risk-sharing condition.] At the social planner opti-
mum with constant discounting of the welfare of future generations,
(29)
where dt is defined in (20) and at is defined in equation (28).
PROOF. Direct.
In the special case of a linear z(-), the terms z'(at) and z'^.J drop out
and one obtains the familiar condition, equating marginal utility of con-
sumption for the young to a constant factor times marginal utility of
consumption for the old state by state, and adjusted with the risk-
curvature term.
In the general case, log linearization helps to deliver further insights.256 Bovenberg and Uhlig
For the variables in (29), denote with an upper bar some benchmark
value for each parameter, which we assume to be known as of date t-1
or possibly earlier, and which together satisfy equation (29). We use an
inverted hat to denote the logarithmic deviation of a variable from this
benchmark. Thus, for example,
For any twice-differentiable function y = fix), define the logarithmic
derivative
/(*)*_ 9 log(flexp[log(s)]})
f f{x)
with the latter equation valid only if x > 0 and y > 0. Further, define the
negative logarithmic derivative of its first derivative per
f(x)x
For example, if/(x) = cx
a, then €f= a and \x,f = 1 - a. Often, \xf arises as
an elasticity.
We shall keep a subindex t to denote the period for which the approx-
imation applies. By assumption, the approximation is around a point
known at t -1 or earlier. For functions with two arguments, we shall also
note the argument(s) with respect to which the derivative is taken. For
example, for some given utility function u, the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution is given by the inverse of \xucc t, whereas the cross-partial
is given by
Furthermore, define the argument share
u(c. , n)
(30)
A complete, explicit list of all logarithmic derivatives can be found at the
beginning of Appendix subsection 5.A.I.
PROPOSITION 2 [The loglinear risk-sharing condition.] Optimal intergen-
emtional risk sharing implies the following first-order approximation to (29) in
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where
«* = <kcAy+knA) + (i - <aa - gw+V^WH (32)
4 = M-J(l - <,,)[*, - E,-i(^)] + yct/, - E,^)]} (33)
PROOF. Calculate or follow the calculations in appendix A.I.
Consider the standard case, in which both z(-) and x(-) are linear, (so
that ix^ t = \xzt = |xz w = 0) and in which old and young agents feature the
same risk aversion in consumption, that is, \xqt = |xucct). If additionally,
labor is assumed to be constant (i.e., ht = 0) or u(c,n) is assumed to be sep-
arable in c and n (i.e., |xuc n t - 0), one obtains
ct.y = ctfi-™r (34)
In that case, the percentage changes of the consumption of the young as
well as of the old per unit of time should be exactly the same. One may
want to consider this as a natural benchmark for risk sharing between
young and old.
If labor is not assumed to be constant and u{c,n) is not separable, equa-
tion (31) becomes instead
cty + nt = clfi - T0t, (35)
where one should note that [xuc n t can have either sign. Consider the case
where consumption and leisure are substitutes and hence, JULUC n t < 0. If
circumstances are such that the social planner commands more work
from the young, nt > 0, the associated decline in leisure enjoyed by the
young will make a marginal unit of consumption for the young rela-
tively more valuable. In order to keep the total increase in marginal util-
ity from consumption the same for both generations, the relative con-
sumption decrease of the young should be smaller than the relative
consumption decrease of the old per unit of time (i.e., ct >ct0- vit). The
direction reverses if leisure and consumption are complements, |xu t nc >
0. Then, changes in leisure of the young (i.e., - nt) are associated with
changes in relative consumption of the young vis-a-vis the old, cty - {ct0
- OTt), which are of the same sign. With complementarity between leisure
and consumption, changes in leisure are associated with changes in con-258 Bovenberg and Uhlig
sumption that further increase the impact of leisure on the overall util-
ity level of the young. Intuitively, decreases in leisure reduce the mar-
ginal utility of the young so that the young not only obtain less leisure
but also consume less relative to the old.
Scale Invariance and Balanced Growth We wish to avoid effects from
rescaling the units in which, for example, capital is measured. An alter-
native interpretation is that we seek a solution delivering a balanced
growth path. Thus,
Definition 5 Let the allocation
be a solution to the social planner's problem, given initial capital k*v Let afli)
be the implied argument share (see equation [30]). The preference specification
1
is said to be scale invariant if for all scalars <j> > 0, $ is a solution to the plan-
ner's problem with initial capital 4>fc*a, where
{§cty, <J)Ct/0/ nt, <J>yt, #()
and if additionally the implied argument share at is unchanged (i.e., af[ht] =
oLt[ht])for all histories ht.
Scale invariance yields a number of implications (see the Appendix):
^L = _ ^ (36)
(37)
(
38)
If in addition we impose that |xuc ct is constant over time (i.e., i\ = \xucct),
we can derive a semiclosed form for the utility function u(c,n), as is well
known from the literature (see e.g., King, Plosser, and Rebelo [1988]):
u(ct.vfnt) =
 [P("'
)C'*
]
1 " (40)
up to a constant, if r\ * 1 andPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 259
for TI = 1.
5.3.3 Epstein-Zin Preferences
We now provide a particular parametric example, satisfying the general
implications listed in the scale invariance and balanced growth subsec-
tion. This parametric example is therefore special only insofar the vari-
ous elasticities and logarithmic derivatives have been assumed to be
constant.
We use the preference specification of (40), that is,
[cv(nW
u{c,n) = / (42)
1-71
with T] 5* 1. We restrict v(n) to be strictly positive and such that u(c,n) sat-
isfies strict concavity and strict monotonicity. Define its logarithmic de-
rivative,
v'(n)n
Note that £v(n) < 0. As before, we let
where nt is some chosen benchmark.
The utility function is
utJt =
 Ct'
yV
 Ht —' ^^ .
In terms of our general specification,
: -?—, (45)
,\
 [(
1 "
x{q) =
1 -v
[(1 -
z(a) =
The argument share at is given per260 Bovenberg and Uhlig
i—n
Preferences and the Length of Life If TJ < 1 and given a total amount
ct+10 of consumption when old, agents prefer a longer life with a fairly
small amount of consumption per unit of time to a shorter life with a
fairly large amount of consumption per unit of time. This is not so, how-
ever, if r\ > 1 with the preference specification above, and indeed, the
utility function then even has the feature, that old agents strictly prefer
a shorter life to a longer life. Put differently, committing suicide is opti-
mal. This is obviously an undesirable feature. As a further consequence,
note that with the previously defined preferences, the limit for -x] —» 1 is
not well defined.
There are at least three ways to resolve this conundrum. One possi-
bility is to modify preferences when old so as to generate strictly posi-
tive utility, whenever the agent is alive. This can be done, for example,
by modifying
q(c) =
(c + c)
1"
1
1 - c
1"
1
1
(46)
for some baseline level of consumption c > 0. With this, total utility while
old is
C \1-T1
— + c
TJX
1-T,
—> log
which exists and is always guaranteed to be positive, but has a noncon-
stant elasticity in c as consumption grows (holding c constant).
The second possibility is to let agents compare utility of consumption
c while alive to some benchmark level of consumption c (possibly de-
pendent on the date t), while alive, and otherwise assign zero utility,
q(c) =
l-T| _
1 -
(47)
so that the total utility for old agents is given byPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 261
vyq\ — I = VJ
xn
—>
C \i--n
/-.1-Tl
1-11
logf
\CUT
which exists and has a constant elasticity as c grows, but may no longer
be guaranteed to be always positive.
The third possibility is to restrict T] < 1 for the original preference spec-
ification. At the expense of generality but at the gain of some simplifica-
tion for the analytics, we shall proceed with this restriction.
In either of these scenarios, the social planner effectively contemplates
insurance against the utility loss (or gain!), when dead. Put differently,
if there is a longevity shock, the old are happier simply due to living
longer. Hence, the social planner may seek to redistribute the gains in
utility of the old to the young.
These insurance motives, while present in this paper, merit deeper
philosophical thought. Suppose, for example, some medical treatment
could be found that extends the life of the old but is rather costly. How
much should it be worth to society, and who should pay for it? This de-
pends rather crucially on the additional utility generated due to being
alive. For the third possibility, that is, our original specification and with
r\ < 1, the additional utility generated is bounded.
With y\ > 1 and the specification (46), the utility gain is unbounded, as
c —» 0; that is, death can be made to be arbitrarily unattractive. In that
case, the cost limit ultimately is the entire GDP. To see this, suppose that
total average consumption of the old is given by c = c(w), reflecting the
cost of improving longevity and the opportunity costs of transferring
consumption from the young to the old. The first-order condition with
respect to xu is given by
l-n
0 = -^
where
i—n
tJT (1 - Q, (48)
€ =
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For any value c(jn)/xn > 0 and €c, there is some c > 0, so that this de-
rivative is positive; that is, unless one obtains direction observations
on choices involving the length of life, there is always some specifica-
tion for the "fear of death," parameterized by c, which would justify
additional spending on life-prolonging measures, no matter how
costly.
Ultimately, from an economic perspective, this raises the need for
measuring the aversion of agents against death in data, and using it to
calibrate these preferences. There are a number of activities where
agents clearly trade off the risk of dying against some utility-enhancing
activity. For example, driving at a higher speed entails a higher risk of
dying, and smoking causes people to die at an earlier age. By carefully
measuring the utility gain (and measuring marginal changes, e.g., due
to the change in the price of cigarettes or due to the higher safety of cars),
one may be able to calculate an economic value for death. This provides
appropriate limits for the amount of resources that should be spent on
extending lives. The difficult discussions—when economic reasoning of
this sort, combined with ethical and moral judgments, provide guide-
lines for the share of GDP to be spent on health care or, more drastically,
turning off life-support measures for a terminally ill patient—have only
begun, and will surely intensify in the future, as the technological pos-
sibilities advance (see e.g., Murphy and Topel [2002] or Hall and Jones
[2004]).
Optimal Risk Sharing
PROPOSITION 3 [Risk-Sharing with Epstein-Zin preferences.] With the
preferences given by (42) and (44) and up to a first-order approximation in the
log deviations around a chosen benchmark, optimal intergenerational risk shar-
ing implies
y - wt), (49)
where
d ^
 (50
)
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a? = 1 -
PROOF. Note first, that for any function/^) = x
a, we have %f — a and \y,f =
1 - a. Leaving away the time subscript t except for |xucnt, £unt and €vt,
since everything else is now constant, calculate
V —
f l--n
and
K,n,t = (1 ~ VK
1-v
€ =
Substitute into equation (31).
Note that we assume r\ < 1, as discussed in the subsection on prefer-
ences and the length of life. Thus, leisure and first-period consumption
are complements and \xu nc t < 0.
To provide some intution for the risk-sharing condition, it may be use-
ful to consider the following six special cases.
1. Assume: no Epstein-Zin, constant labor. Result: perfect correlation of
per-period consumption,
2. Assume: additionally, endogenous labor. Result: since r\ < 1, that is,
since leisure and consumption of the young are complements, leisure
moves in the same direction as consumption of the young relative to per-
period consumption of the old. To see this, rewrite264 Bovenberg and Uhlig
as
-I
-l) * nt] = ^ nt] = c(<y - (cti0 - wt).
The intuition was discussed subsequent to proposition 2.
3. Assume: the old are risk averse, v>r\, while there is no additional life
risk aversion, £; = r\ > 0. Benchmark uses information up to t -1.
Result: the old bear less of the risk. Longevity enters separately from
old-age consumption.
v
1 — TJ IT] V
4. Assume: the old are risk averse, v > 0. The young are risk neutral,
v = 0. Assume constant labor. Result: the young bear all the risk,
0 = ctfi -
5. Assume: infinite elasticity of intertemporal substitution, r\ = 0, con-
stant labor, equal risk aversion of young and old, v = £ > 0. Evaluate risk
sharing based on information up to t - 1. Result: the lifetime consump-
tion of the young reacts as much as consumption of the old,
aAy
 + 0- ~ <*t)Ef(W0) = cti0 - Et_y{ct0).
6. Assume: infinite elasticity of intertemporal substitution, no risk aver-
sion of the old r\ - v = 0, constant labor, but risk aversion of young, £ >
0. Evaluate the risk-sharing condition based on information up to and
including t-1. Result: The old bear all the risk,
0 = oLftJ9 + (1 - at)Et(ct+1J.
The parameter £ is most sensibly interpreted as life-risk aversion.
Suppose ct0 = Et_x{ct 0), that is, old-age consumption changes are pre- dictable when these agents are young, and suppose that VJ{ = 0. Then,
the right-hand side of equation (49) can be written as
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The relevant scaling parameter on the rate of change for consumption of
the old, ct0, is given by a combination of the curvature parameter t] of
the utility of the young and life-risk aversion £. The curvature parameter
of the young comes in because, with a foreseeable shock, the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution between the two periods of life rather
than the post-birth old-age risk aversion v matters.
If relative consumption changes are the same, cs 0 — cs_x , for s — t and
s = t - 1, and if labor stays constant, nt — nH = 0. then af — csy = cs+10
for s = t and s = t - 1, and the risk-sharing condition (49) for a foresee-
able shock becomes
Ky = Ko, (52)
as in (34). That is, young and old should share consumption risk equally
(in proportion to their benchmark level), when faced with a foreseeable
shock. Their relevant risk aversion is now the life-risk aversion £, which
is the same for both generations.
With unanticipated changes, by contrast—that is, if E^c^) = ct = 0,
and assuming fixed employment and longevity, as well as ct = Et(ct+10),
the risk-sharing condition (49) becomes
&, = vcfc0. (53)
Whereas old-age risk aversion v is relevant for consumption of the old
in this case, life-risk aversion ^ applies to the young. Indeed, in contrast
to the young, who can change all the arguments of their utility function,
the old can only adjust their old-age consumption in response to an
unanticipated shock. Equation (53) is a version of one of the results an-
nounced in the introduction: the old bear a proportionally larger share
of the consumption risk, if their risk aversion is lower than the corre-
sponding life-risk aversion. In section 5.6 we shall see that this result
continues to hold approximately for reasonable parameters, when pref-
erences toward leisure are introduced.
5.4 Solving the Social Planner's Problem and Parametric Choices
Assume from now on that preferences are given by equation (44).
To turn the endogenous variables into a stationary system, define
Ct,y
 s ~T~'
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K-i
.-. - Vt
_ K
except that we do not detrend nt and that we define
a,
at=
 l
where
st LV-
1- '\/
uti
 xt • W^V
The exponent of the normalization variable differs here in order to
achieve the appropriate scaling for these utility variables. Moreover,
note that we scale st by k
vt~^ rather than by fc£f because that way, sw
(rather than sM and kt_x) turns out to be the only remaining endogenous-
state variable.
One can then solve for a steady state in these detrended variables as
well as calculate the dynamics around this steady state using log lin-
earization. The details are available in the appendix. Here we highlight
only some key results.
5.4.2 Parametric Choices
To explicitely calculate the steady state and provide quantitative results,
we introduce a number of parametric assumptions regarding prefer-
ences, technologies, and shocks.
For preferences regarding leisure, we assume, specifically, thatPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 267
_ (1 - n)
1
v(n) = v
1 -X
with 0 < x < 1- Consequently,
n
(55)
„(«) =-(i-x)-\-n
-M = -X
\-n
For the production function/^), we assume
f{x) = [6 + (1 - e^i-a/^i/i (56)
with 0 ^ 6 < 1 and vj; > 0 (where one should note that we usually use x
= Zn as argument), and thus
P (x) =
= -[1 - €f(x)].
For if; —> 1, this becomes
2
f{x) = x
1-
9
with
£fix) = 1 - 0,
(57)
For the stochastic part, let
A
be the vector of exogenous parameters. We assume a steady state t, ex-
ists and that268 Bovenberg and Uhlig
follows an AR(1) process,
I = Nit_x + et
for some 5X5 matrix N with nonexplosive roots, where
(58)
-A,t
-z,t
-5,t
is the vector of innovations for each exogenous parameter, with
5.4.2 The Steady State
For general production functions and preferences, the steady-state
equations yield the following relationships between the detrended vari-
ables,
TTC
I- JZ azw;
-UW
(59)
= K,[Af(Zn) + 1-5],
(60)
(61)
where
K3 = —
and
K4 = co exp -
exp •n(i-v) 2
rR-vc
where a
2R_vc denotes the conditional variance of log Rt+1 + <; log(tnt+1) -
v log(ct+10) and a
2x is the conditional variance of s log xst+1 + (1 - v) log
ct+10 where s = [r|/(l—T|)](1 - v). These equations provide insight into thePension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 269
fraction of output spent on consumption of the young and the old, as
well as the endogenous growth factor k.
Substituting these equations into the equation on feasibility
—^i 1 + z^r = 1 +
V \ vcj Af(Zn)
leads to a single nonlinear equation in n,
(1 + K3{K4[A/(Zn) + 1 - W-ve^^-iA.) (62)
1 - 8 - ^{K4[A/(ZH) + 1 - 8]}
x/«
Af{Zn)
With the parametric choice for preferences (i.e., v(n) = v[(l - n)
1-x]/
(1 - x)) and the production function (i.e.,/(x) = [0 + (1 - 0)x
1-
(1/4<)]
1/[1-
(1/lt'
)]),
the Appendix analyzes a special case in which the steady-state solution
for employment can be calculated in closed form.
5.4.3 The Dynamics
After detrending with kt_v the model no longer contains a state variable,
except
st - stk
vt .
This variable arises solely from the intertemporal optimization of the so-
cial planner, and disappears if, for example, r\ = £, that is, if lifetime risk
aversion equals the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion. One can think of st as representing a utility promise to future gen-
erations, or as a device that allows the social planner to share a risk
across many generations, if there is additional lifetime risk aversion.
Using log linearization and assuming a recursive law of motion in
which st_x is the only-state variable, one can show that the dynamics can
be reduced to solving a third-degree polynomial.
for some coefficients 0S, 0SS, 0SSS, and 0SSSS. The explicit calculations can
be found in Appendix subsection 5.A.5.
Equation (63) generally has three roots, <f>ssi,i
 = 1,2,3, and for which
closed-form solutions are available. If only one of these roots is stable,
that is, less than 1 in absolute value, then this is the root we use. If more
than one stable root exists, then an additional state variable is needed, as270 Bovenberg and Uhlig
generally would be necessary to solve the system. If there are no stable
roots, the system is explosive and our baseline assumption that there is
a stationary solution to the social planner's problem in the detrended
variables is unjustified.
When computing the following results, we use the toolkit implemen-
tation (see Uhlig [1999]), and allow for up to five rather than one en-
dogenous-state variable, mostly for accounting reasons (see the Appen-
dix).
5.5 Decentralization and Generational Accounting
The social planner's solution can be implemented in a decentralized
economy using lump-sum taxes and transfers on young and old agents
and possibly a return subsidy to old agents, when privately holding cap-
ital in order to equate the social and the private rate of return.
We assume that production occurs by a competitive sector of firms,
renting capital and hiring labor from competitive households and expe-
riencing an externality in production. More precisely, assume that pro-
duction by firm; is given by
1
(64)
where Nt . is the amount of labor hired by firm / and KM • is the amount
of capital rented by firm/. The term (K^/TI,) is an externality, enhancing
labor productivity in proportion to the capital available per young per-
son. Assuming that firms hire workers at their marginal product and
rent capital at its marginal product on competitive markets, one can eas-
ily show that the capital-labor ratio across all firms is the same, and that
the aggregate production function becomes (7).
The private rate of return to investing in capital is given by
)Ztnt (65)
where we recall the social rate of return from equation (24) as
br (66)
Thus, the private rate of return is diminished by the externality in accu-
mulating capital, which is measured by the total wage payments per
unit of capital,
Aj (Ztnt)Ztnt = — = — . Kt-i
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Note that wages are given by (21), that is,
iv = A fc f'CZ, n ) - (67)
We assume that the budget constraint of the individual household is
given by
ct,y + st + Tty = wtnt (68)
ct+u + Vi,0 = (1 + °t+i)Rffist> (
69)
where st is private savings date t, T( y is a lump-sum tax when young, Tt+10 is a lump-sum tax when old, and crt+1 is a return subsidy.
We shall focus on two extreme scenarios. In the first—call it the case
of "private capital"—all capital is held privately and the government
budget balances period by period,
Define the tax share as
^ = -^ = 1-^-— (70) T
f'
pri
v
wtnt wtnt wtnt
in order to express the magnitude of the lump-sum taxes more intu-
itively in proportion to the wage earnings of the young. One may want
to view the average value of this share as reflecting the desire of the so-
cial planner toward redistribution, while its fluctuations may be viewed
as fluctuating insurance payments of the young to the old in response to
realizations of macroeconomic risks.
In this scenario, it is necessary to subsidize the returns to capital in
proportion to capital held by the individual agent so that the total pro-
portional subsidy amounts to giving the entire production, including
the capital stock net of depreciation to the capital-holding old agents,
and in turn lump-sum taxing the old agents so that the government bud-
get constraint balances,
Dsoc
_
 J\+i _ -i
npriv '
Ixf+1
wt+1irt+1n t+1irt+1nt+1
DprivJU '
T = rj RP
rivA: — TT T272 Bovenberg and Uhlig
One interpretation of this last equation is that the generational account
balances—that is, the generational account of the old equals minus the
generational account of the young.
In the second scenario—call it "the case of public capital"—all capital
is held by pension funds,
st = 0.
Thus, the lump-sum taxes to be paid by the young are payments to pen-
sion funds, which, in turn, finance old-age consumption. Note that this
is a mixture of a pay-as-you-go system and a fully funded system. In this
case, the payments by the young to the pension system are
v-i — i
 (71
)
We examine both.
A defined benefit system can be viewed as a system where the old do
not bear any of the risk (except perhaps longevity), whereas the old bear
the entire risk of random returns in a defined contribution system. This
analysis considers the degree of optimal risk sharing between young
and old. The relationship between the solution to the social planner's
problem, as investigated here, and these more-specific, "real world"
pension systems, will be investigated in future research.
5.6 Quantitative Results
This section explores the quantitative properties of the model and nu-
merically calculates the reaction of the various quantities to the relevant
shocks. We use a hat on variables to denote the logarithmic deviation
from the expected balanced growth path with st constant (see Appendix
subsection Loglinearization for details).
5.6.2 Benchmark Parameterization
As a benchmark parameterization, pick co = p = 0.4,4» = 1, r\ = 0.5, 8 =
l,and£ = v = 2.Setx = -5,6 = l/3r w = 1,¥ = 1,Z = 1, and let Z such
that there is no growth in steady state, k = 1, requiring A — 2.825.
The resulting benchmark equilibrium has n = 0.831, cy/y = 0.27, co/cy
= 1.22, and R = 2.5, which corresponds to an annualized interest rate of
3.1 percent, assuming that one period lasts 30 years.
The lump-sum taxes relative to the wage bill of the young is Tpriv =Pension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 273
-0.65 percent; that is, in the case of privately held capital, the young
agent would receive a fairly neglible subsidy (financed out of a lump-
sum tax on the "rich old," who also finance their own return subsidy).
The lump-sum payment to the pension fund, in case of publicly held
capital, is Tpub = 59 percent; that is, the young would pay somewhat
more than half of their wage earnings into the fund.
We have assumed the exogenous parameters to be i.i.d., except for
longevity vjt, which we assume to be a random walk. For the latter, it
seems plausible that medical progress is permanent. For the other vari-
ables, note that, for example, total factor productivity (TFP) has a unit
root due to the endogenous growth feature of our model, even though
the TFP parameter At (and the labor-productivity parameter Zt) is i.i.d.
Also, note that irf denotes population growth, so that the log of popula-
tion follows a random walk if irf is i.i.d.
5.6.2 Comparative Statics
The sensitivity of these results to three parameters, £, 8, and co = (3 can
be seen in Table 5.3. The last row in that table lists the feedback coeffi-
cient on the endogenous state st for the dynamic solution. While the first
three columns have risk aversion of young and old the same, the last
three columns set the life-risk aversion to the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of the young—that is, they do not modify the ex post util-
ity of the young by a further risk transformation so that the social-
intertemporal substitution elasticity coincides with the corresponding
private elasticity. Note that the last three columns are fairly similar to the
Table 5.3
A comparison of steady states, when varying some parameters.
£
8 =
w = (3 =
n —
k =
co/cy =
Tpriv =
Tpub ~~
2.00
1.00
0.40
0.83
1.00
0.27
1.22
-0.65
59.38
0.15
2.00
0.00
0.40
0.80
1.17
0.33
1.81
-21.83
50.35
0.19
2.00
1.00
0.80
0.83
1.00
0.27
1.22
-0.65
59.38
0.12
0.50
1.00
0.40
0.83
1.00
0.27
1.22
-0.56
59.37
-0.00
0.50
0.00
0.40
0.83
1.94
0.28
1.20
-59.68
57.62
-0.00
0.50
1.00
0.80
0.83
1.00
0.27
1.22
-0.56
59.37
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first three columns, except for this feedback coefficient and a substantial
change for Tpriv in case of no depreciation.
Table 5.3 shows which factors determine optimal intergenerational
distribution. In particular, the sign of the variable Tpriv indicates to what
extent the optimal pension system is funded. A positive value for 7priv in-
dicates that the pension system is in part pay-as-you-go financed. In that
case, the generational account for the young is negative (and for the old
is positive) in the absence of shocks. There is systematic redistribution
from the young to the old.
In the benchmark calculation, systematic redistribution is limited.
The benchmark social optimum thus calls for a small amount of sys-
tematic redistribution from the old to the young in the decentralized
economy.
The second column of table 5.3 shows that the systematic redistribu-
tion toward the young is increased if the current old become richer com-
pared to the young on account of a lower depreciation rate (more capi-
tal income compared to labor income). Note also that the growth rate k
increases. The higher return on capital (as a result of a lower deprecia-
tion rate) allows for a higher growth rate. The young save more because
of two reasons: a higher return (substitution effect) and higher income
(since the old transfer more income to the young). Another way of in-
terpreting the increased systematic redistribution from the old to the
young (an inverse pay-as-you-go [PAYG] system) is that the pension
system is overfunded. Intuitively, funding increases because the return
on capital increases and the older generation becomes richer.
A comparison of the second and fifth column of table 5.3 shows that
the additional systematic redistribution in favor of the young due to a
lower depreciation rate becomes more substantial if ex ante risk aver-
sion £; decreases. The reason is that there is a lower social preference for
similar utility levels across generations. Hence, making future genera-
tions better off compared to the current generation (as a result of higher
return on capital and thus growth) becomes more attractive, and sys-
tematic redistribution from the old to the young is further increased. The
old keep less of their additional income, as a result of higher capital in-
come due to a lower depreciation rate.
Obviously, this systematic redistribution between young and old
would be heavily affected by letting the discount factor of the social
planner w and the discount factor of the private agent (3 differ. As an al-
ternative possibility for comparing steady states, one could calibrate w
and P in such a way that laissez faire in intergenerational distribution isPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 275
optimal in the absence of shocks—that is, Tpriv = 0. Then, the decentral-
ized economy with private capital yields the correct intergenerational
distribution, assuming that the old pay their own investment subsidy.
5.6.3 Endogenous Dynamics
In table 5.3, and focusing on the last row in the last three columns, note
that there is no feedback on the endogenous state (i.e., cps s), if the lifetime
risk aversion £ equals the intertemporal elasticity of substitution -n; that
is, if the social intertemporal substitution elasticity coincides with the
private intertemporal substitution elasticity.
We are particularly interested in exploring the risk-sharing features as
the risk aversion of the old, v, is varied vis-a-vis the life-risk aversion of
the young, £. Figure 5.1 shows the dependence of the feedback coeffi-
cient cpss as these two risk-aversion parameters v and £ are varied be-
tween r\ - 0.5 and the value 4 at the upper end. As one can see, the en-
Feedback coeff. on the state s
0 o
Figure 5.1.
Endogenous dynamics, that is, feedback coefficient cpss, on the endogenous state, as the
risk-aversion parameters are varied.276 Bovenberg and Uhlig
dogenous dynamics depend practically entirely on £ alone within this
two-dimensional variation.
The impact of the state variable cps s is determined by the divergence
between £ and nq and the importance of endogenous labor supply (i.e.,
the size of x; if X
 = 1/ labor supply is exogenous). The more difficult it be-
comes to substitute across generations compared to intertemporal sub-
stitution within generations as measured by r\, the more shocks are
spread out across various generations, as indicated by a larger feedback
impact of the state variable.
Shifting risks between the old and the young when the shocks hit is
sufficient if £; = T). In that case, the young affect their saving behavior in
the socially optimal way to redistribute between generations and the
government does not have to perform any additional redistribution next
period.
5.6.4 Inter generational Risk Sharing
Table 5.4 contains the corresponding feedback coefficients to three
shocks: total factor productivity Z, longevity VJ, and population growth
IT. There, <pgrowth, refers to the absolute change in the growth rate (rather
than relative to the growth factor k). If, for example, <pgrowth z = 1.28, then
this means that the capital stock will grow by an additional 1.28 percent,
if TFP increases by 1 percent. Likewise, <\>jpTivZ = -0.35 says that the
lump-sum tax to be paid in case of privately held capital is lowered by
0.35 percent of the current wage bill, in case TFP increases by 1 percent.
To shed light on risk sharing, we have included three more quantities.
First and second, we have calculated the reaction coefficient for the total
tax collection from the young, normalized by the unchanged wage earn-
ings, each for the case of private as well as public capital. In the case of
private capital, this is
TT T
W = ==
 (72
)
TTWH
and its percentage change is given byTable 5.4.
Parameter variations and feedback coefficients.
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Note that this coincides with the reaction coefficient for Tpriv, if T = 0.
Likewise,
with
The total Tprivtot is the total contribution of the young to a pension sys-
tem where capital is held privately. In particular, if it is identical to zero
and unaffected by shocks, this means that the young do not contribute
to insuring the old, and that the old have to bear the entire risk to the re-
turns of their capital alone. Put differently, this number indicates addi-
tional intergenerational risk sharing compared to a decentralized equi-
librium in which the old can save only through capital markets (and the
old finance their own investment subsidy). The government's ability, in
fact, to create new assets to allow trade of risks between generations is
indicated by Tpriv.
Third, we have also calculated the change in consumption of the old
relative to the total change in consumption, that is, the feedback coeffi-
cient for the (log-linearized) quantity
ratt = AL = ^ . (74)
Ctot,t
 Co,t + Vfy,t
In log deviations,
ratt = F—(
£o.t - cy,t ~ £*)• (
75)
If this quantity is unchanged, that is, if the feedback is zero, then this
means that consumption of the old increases in proportion to overall
consumption resources. Generally, rat > 0 in one of three cases. It hap-
pens if both consumptions rise, but ct 0 rises relatively more. It also hap-
pens if both consumptions fall, but ct 0 falls relatively less. Finally, it
happens if ct0 rises and cty falls. These three cases ought to be kept in
mind when evaluating the results.
The dependence of the shock reaction of these three quantities, as well
as labor supply on the two risk-aversion parameters v and £, are shown
in figures 5.2 through 5.5, both as a three-dimensional mesh as well as a
two-dimensional contour plot.Pension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 279
Old cons. rel. to total, prod, shock Labor, productivity shock
0 0
Old cons. rel. to total, popul. shock
0 0
Labor, population shock
0 0
Old cons. rel. to total, longev. shock
0 o
Labor, longevity shock
0 0
Figure 5.2.
Reaction of consumption of old relative to total consumption as well as reaction of labor,
as the risk-aversion parameters are varied.
For the impulse responses, we have used the benchmark parameter-
ization, except for setting £j = 1 rather than £ = 2. This does not change
the steady state, but makes for a differential reaction of consumption of
the young vis-a-vis consumption of the old (see the following discus-
sion), and therefore for more differentiated impulse response figures.
They are shown in figures 5.6 to 5.11. The upper left corner shows the280 Bovenberg and Uhlig
Old cons. rel. to total, prod, shock Labor, productivity shock
Figure 5.3.
Contour plots. Reaction of consumption of old relative to total consumption as well as
reaction of labor, as the risk-aversion parameters are varied.
response of normalized consumption of the young, old, and the capital
stock, whereas the lower left corner provides the corresponding level
variables, that is, without dividing by aggregate capital. The upper
right corner shows the responses of labor, output (normalized), and
growth, while the lower right corner shows the responses of the lump-Pension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 281
Tax of young, priv. cap., prod, shock Tax of young, pub. cap., prod, shock
0 o
Tax of young, priv. cap., popul. shock
0 0
Tax of young, pub. cap., popul. shock
o o
Tax of young, priv. cap., longev. shock
0 0
Tax of young, pub. cap., longev. shock
0 o
Figure 5.4.
Reaction of total tax payments to young relative to unchanged labor income, as the risk-
aversion parameters are varied.
sum taxes to be paid by the young, expressed as a percentage of the
steady-state wage bill. Likewise, the response of depreciation is ex-
pressed as a percentage of the capital stock, not as a percentage of the
steady-state depreciation rate (which is assumed to be zero, anyway).
All figures also show the response of the shocked variable, that is,282 Bovenberg and Uhlig
Tax of young, priv. cap., prod shock Tax of young, pub. cap., prod, shock
Tax of young, priv. cap., longev. shock
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Figure 5.5.
Contour plots. Reaction of total tax payments by young relative to unchanged labor in-
come, as the risk-aversion parameters are varied.
longevity, TFP, labor productivity, population, and depreciation as well
as the response of the state variable s, as one proceeds from figure 5.6 to
5.11.
The lower left corner pictures show the persistence effect of shocks
due to the endogenous growth feature of the model. However, the ef-Pension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 283
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Figure 5.6.
Impulse responses for a 1 percent shock to longevity, given the benchmark parameteri-
zation.
fects are usually not an instantaneous adjustment to some new level, but
the response is "smeared out" over a few generations, due to the en-
dogenous dynamics of the state variable st. The endogenous dynamics
itself is plotted in figure 5.11.
The responses to a shock in TFP are practically the same (up to scal-
ing) to a shock to labor productivity, because we have essentially as-
sumed a Cobb-Douglas production function. For the benchmark cali-
bration and in reaction, the consumption of the young rises somewhat
more than the consumption of the old, which can also be seen by a re-
duction the young are supposed to make to the pension system, that is,
a lowering of their lump-sum taxes. In response to a shock to population
growth, consumption falls: essentially, the young now have to make do
with less capital per capita than before. Due to the endogenous growth
formulation of the model, this effect persists.284 Bovenberg and Uhlig
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Figure 5.7.
Impulse responses for a 1 percent shock to total factor productivity, given the benchmark
parameterization.
5.6.5 Technology Shocks
In the simplest risk-sharing case, consumption of the young and old rise
by the same percentage (see the first case of the interpretation of the gen-
eral risk-sharing equation and equation [34]). There, this case is obtained
if there is no endogenous labor supply and risk aversion and intertem-
poral substitution are assumed to be the same for the young and the old,
and where there are no life risks. The case of equal risk sharing can arise
in the full version of the model as well. Indeed, for the case of a technol-
ogy shock Z and for the case that £j = v, and with full depreciation 8=1,
consumption of the young as well as the old rises one for one with pro-
ductivity, and there is no shift in old-age consumption relative to total
consumption, as the first block of table 5.4 shows. The tax payments both
for the case of private capital as well as public capital do not react as both
labor income (collected by the young) and capital income (collected by
the old) rise proportionally with productivity. There is a reaction of thePension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 285
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Impulse responses for a 1 percent shock to labor productivity, given the benchmark pa-
rameterization .
total tax collection from the young in case of publicly held capital simply
because their wages rise, and because the initial tax rate in case of pub-
licly held capital is not zero.
Whether the consumption of the old or the consumption of the young
reacts more strongly depends on the ratio between life risk aversion ver-
sus risk aversion when old. The upper left corner of the contour plot of
figure 5.3 shows a straight line of no reaction in the old-consumption-to-
total-consumption ratio for the case v = £. If v is larger than £, that is, if
the old are relatively more risk averse, then the consumption of the old
reacts less strongly, and most of the risk is thus born by the young. In-
deed, the young will then consume more goods and consume more
leisure (as the income effect dominates the substitution effect), which is
why labor declines in response (see the upper right corner of the same
contour plot).286 Bovenberg and Uhlig
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Impulse responses for a 1 percent shock to population growth, given the benchmark pa-
rameterization.
To implement the higher sensitivity of the consumption of the young,
when the risk aversion of the young is relatively low, actually requires
an additional subsidy from the old to the young in the case of privately
held capital or a lower total tax payment in the case of publicly held cap-
ital if a positive production shock materializes. This is paid out of the in-
creased return to capital in the hands of the old, as, for example, the up-
per left hand corner of figure 5.4 shows. It is easier to see the intuition for
a case of a less-than-expected growth in technology, resulting in lower
capital and labor income. In that case, the young have to make up for the
low returns on equity by working harder and giving up some of their
wage income. In other words, the young bear most of the productivity
risk by transferring additional resources to the old in bad times and by
collecting additional resources from the old in bad times. Risks are
traded in just the opposite way if the old are relatively less risk averse.
The reaction of total consumption is modified by the rate of deprecia-Pension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 287
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Impulse responses for a 1 percent shock to depreciation, given the benchmark parame-
terization.
tion: with only partial depreciation, as in the second and fifth column of
table 5.4, some consumption smoothing is possible out of capital so pro-
duction shocks result in less volatile consumption. At the same time, a
positive production results in less additional growth (compared to a full
1 percent advantage in growth due to the additional 1 percent growth in
TFP).
5.6.6 Population Growth Shocks
Note that the consumption of the young and the old always move in the
same direction for all shocks, as can be seen both from the impulse re-
sponses as well as from table 5.4. This is a key difference between opti-
mal risk sharing and decentralized pension systems. For example, in the
absence of insurance, a population growth shock will enhance the re-
turn to capital, due to the abundance of labor. At the same time, the288 Bovenberg and Uhlig
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Impulse responses for an initial 1 percent deviation of the state from its steady state.
shock induces lower wages, lower consumption of the young, and
higher consumption of the old. This is not the case with optimal risk
sharing: both the consumption of the young and the old decrease.
The response of old versus young consumption depends again on the
relationship between old-age risk aversion versus life risk aversion. The
young need to be actually slightly more risk averse for the relative con-
sumption changes of the old and young to be the same (see the first three
columns and the rows for c0 and ctot in table 5.4).
Labor of the young declines with the population shock: this should be
an unsurprising consequence of the substitution effect, as the marginal
product of labor falls. Note, however, how the income effect (which may
lead young agents to work harder) is offset here due to the risk-sharing
arrangement with the currently old.
Note also that the difference between the tax rate Tpriv, when not ac-
counting for the changes in wages, population, and labor, and the total
tax collection Tprivtot is fairly minor in all cases, that is, even if the steady-
state values for these tax rates are nonzero. The same holds true for thePension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 289
case of publicly held capital. This result comes about because the addi-
tional population growth is almost nearly completely offset by the de-
cline in wages and the change in hours.
5.6.7 Shocks to Longevity
The reaction to a longevity shock shows a number of interesting and
possibly counterintuitive features. If the young are sufficiently risk
neutral, they are asked to work harder individually, in order to some-
how generate additional resources. However, as table 5.4 shows, these
resources do not go to the currently old—total consumption for the
currently old (and therefore, certainly per-period consumption of the
currently old) actually falls! Instead, because the longevity shock is
persistent, the additional resources are planted into higher capital for
the future, and growth picks up. That is, the same generation that now
is asked to work harder is also the first generation that gets to enjoy the
fruits of this additional labor in the form of higher old-age consumption
(see also the impulse response in figure 5.6). The drop in (total) con-
sumption for the currently old is not quite as dramatic as the drop in
consumption of the currently young, and thus, consumption is actually
shifted in their favor in terms of their share of total consumption.
The intuition for the additional redistribution in favor of future gen-
erations in response to increased longevity is as follows. Longer lon-
gevity raises the marginal utility of old-age consumption and therefore
increases the return on private saving. The higher implicit return on
saving makes it more attractive to redistribute toward future genera-
tions, especially if the social intertemporal substitution elasticity l/£j is
large. The comparison between the first three columns and the last three
columns of table 5.4 shows indeed that the growth response to longevity
is larger if £ is smaller. We find a larger growth response to an increase
in longevity than Bohn (2003) for two reasons. First, our calibration im-
plies a relatively large intertemporal substitution elasticity. Second, in
view of the endogenous growth feature of our model, the marginal
product of capital does not decline with capital accumulation. Hence,
shifting resources over time and between generations can be attractive
in response to shocks.
Increased longevity raises not only saving but also work effort. In-
deed, the higher marginal utility of consumption on account of a longer
expected life makes work more attractive. Note also that the difference
between the tax rate Tpriv, when not accounting for the changes in wages,
population, and labor, and the total tax collection Tprivtot is fairly sub-290 Bovenberg and Uhlig
stantial if the steady-state values for the tax rates are nonzero, most no-
tably in the fifth column of table 5.4. The same holds true for the case of
publicly held capital. This result comes about because the fairly large
change in labor supply by the young triggers additional tax collections
in that scenario.
5.7 Conclusion
We have developed a stochastic endogenous growth with overlapping
generations to explore optimal intergenerational risk sharing and redis-
tribution to explore how the pension system can implement optimal in-
tergenerational risk sharing and redistribution between old, young, and
future generations. Our endogenous growth model is fairly tractable,
despite featuring endogenous labor supply, a number of different
shocks, and nonseparable preferences. Depending on the risk aversion
of the various generations, the pension system can help to diversify the
financial market risks faced by older generations and the labor market
and human capital risks faced by younger generations.
A number of interesting insights emerge from the quantitative ex-
ploration of the model, as discussed in detail in section 5.6: Neither a
defined benefit system or a defined contribution system is typically
optimal from a social planner's perspective. In particular, per capita con-
sumption of the young and the old always move in the same direction,
even for positive population growth shocks. This result is in contrast to
the response of a fully funded decentralized system to such shocks: there,
the old would receive higher per capita consumption (due to the increase
in return to capital), while the young would receive lower per capita con-
sumption (due to decreasing marginal returns in labor from the larger
working population). In contrast to what a defined benefit system offers,
longer life expectancy optimally requires old agents to get by with less re-
sources. Indeed, persistent increases in longevity will lead to lower total
consumption of the old (and thus certainly lower per-period consump-
tion of the old) and the young as well as to higher work effort of the
young. The additional resources are used to increase growth and future
output, resulting in higher consumption of future generations.
In future work, we plan to use the model to explore how the intergen-
erational risk-sharing properties of the pension system affect the equity
premium. In particular, in a laissez f aire equilibrium without intergener-
ational risk sharing, the equity premium may be quite high, as the risk-
averse retired generations cannot share capital income risk with otherPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 291
generations. In the presence of a defined-benefit pension system, how-
ever, the old can shed some of this risk to younger generations. In effect,
the young issue bonds to the older generations and invest the proceeds
in the capital market. In this way, the young have become residual
claimants of the pension funds and thus share in the investment risk. By
thus spreading investment risk more widely over the population and al-
lowing the young to in effect borrow against their human capital to in-
vest in the stock market (see Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra
[2002]), the equity premium can fall (and the risk-free rate can rise) in
general equilibrium. Indeed, defined-benefit pension funds may help in-
dividuals to implement an optimal life investment plan, which typically
involves individuals' borrowing heavily in the beginning of their life to
invest in the stock market (see Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992),
Davis, Kubler, and Willen (2002), Jagannathan and Kocherlakota (1996),
and Teulings and de Vries [2006]). These pension plans thus in effect al-
low the young to participate in the stock market. If households
can choose between low-risk (and low-return) and high-risk (and high-
return) investments, better intergenerational risk sharing can boost
growth by maintaining incentives for risk taking in high-return invest-
ments (see Obstfeld [1994] in the context of international risk sharing). At
the same time, however, better risk sharing may decrease precautionary
saving, thereby reducing capital accumulation and growth. We plan to
estimate the potential effects of the pension system in calibrated models.
In allowing intergenerational risk sharing through government inter-
vention, we have assumed that the young cannot participate in capital
markets at all to share risks (before the uncertainty during their life time
has unfolded). One interpretation is that human capital is not tradable
and that the young therefore cannot borrow at all against their human
capital to invest in financial capital (see also Constantinides, Donaldson,
and Mehra [2002]). In practice, however, the young may be able to par-
ticipate in equity-market risk that materializes during their working ca-
reer, either by borrowing, by investing all their saving in the risk-
bearing capital, or by buying call options. Indeed, capital markets allow
in principle for risk sharing between overlapping generations, espe-
cially if the young can borrow. In this regard, our calculations, which as-
sumed only two discrete periods of life, are likely to overstate the po-
tential risk-sharing benefits from defined-benefit pension plans. In
future work, we would like to explore how sensitive our results are with
respect to alternative assumptions about the extent (including the fre-
quency) to which the young can participate in capital markets.292 Bovenberg and Uhlig
Our analysis has assumed that governments can implement optimal
intergenerational risk sharing by committing future generations to a
risk-sharing contract. For the question of implementability, additional
aspects seem crucial. First, government intervention may not only help
to share market risks but also give rise to new risks. These additional po-
litical risks must be traded off against the possible gains in sharing mar-
ket risks. Second, the government may face serious problems in com-
mitting future generations to an optimal complete risk-sharing contract.
For one, in a democracy in which current generations have the voting
power, the government faces a serious commitment problem; future
generations can always opt out. For another, the government faces sub-
stantial fundamental uncertainty, so that complete contracts are exces-
sively costly. With substantial fundamental uncertainty, discretion
rather than rules become optimal.
Optimal risk sharing is sensitive to the magnitude of ex ante risk aver-
sion £ versus ex post risk aversion v. The latter type of risk aversion may
exceed ex ante risk aversion in the presence of habit formation (see also
Bohn [2003]). Habit formation, however, gives rise to new phenomena.
Another explanation for high levels of risk aversion is the standard-of-
living utility, in which people are sensitive to their utility level com-
pared to that of others. Exploring the sensitivity of our results to alter-
native specifications of preferences is an important subject for future
research.
We have relied on numerical solutions. In some special cases, how-
ever, we can solve the model analytically. This may provide a useful
benchmark for understanding the features of the optimal solution in
other, more complicated cases. We plan to investigate the analytical so-
lutions in the future.
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Notes
1. Note that the production side is already made scale invariant by construction, that is,
our assumption about AK-type endogenous growth.
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Appendix A Details and Additionally Useful Results
A.I The Calculations for Proposition 2
The explicit expressions for the logarithmic derivatives are
=
 uStt,y nt)cttV
•"•'" u(ctiy,nt) '
u'
nA u(cn) '
x"- -
Ct+U
vjt+1q\ =
tu.
Furthermore, define
z"(atWt
UcSft,y' "fay
^ =296 Bovenberg and Uhlig
Recall (30),
=
 u^
n\ (76)
Note that all these logarithmic derivatives are known as of t -1 by as-
sumption. The time subscript therefore does not indicate "information",
but rather indicates the argument.
To derive the equations in proposition 2, one needs to take a first-
order Taylor expansion in the logarithmic deviations. These calculations
can often be performed rather speedily by combining several "rules",
which are easily verified:
[Rule 1:] To take the Taylor expansion for a single variable, note
xt = xtexpxt~xt(l +xt).
[Rule 2:] If zt = Axtyt, where A is some constant, and the same is true for
the benchmark values, then
[Rule 3:] If zt = xt + yt and the same is true for the benchmark values,
then
[Rule 4:] Suppose some variable zt satisfies zt =f(xt) as well as zt =f(xt). Then,
where €fis the logarithmic derivative of/(-) at xt,
,, =f (*,)*,
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The extension to two variables, zt - f(xt, yt) is
where
f'
x~ f(r TJ) ' f>y~ f(x v) '
Note furthermore, that
and that
Vx-ht= -y^
1. (78)
Define the variables
ut = u{ctyl nt)
t!Tf
Note that et = x[vjt+1q(ct+lt0/xnt+1)] and eM = x[rntq(ct0/wt)], since we as- sume that the benchmark levels are known at date t-1 already.
With this, the risk-sharing condition (29),
z'(at)
 Kt'
v * =z'(at_x)?-dtq'l
 tc298 Bovenberg and Uhlig
can be written as
The argument definition
«, =
 UK> nt) + P*"
1! Et\ x wt+1q{ ^^\ \\ (80)
can likewise be written as
at = ut + ptt (81)
Finally, the definition for the discounting correction (20),
(82)
can be written as
dt = i't_lX'r (83)
1. Taking logarithms of equation (79) delivers
z; + «:, = z;-i + 4 + #-
Application of rule 4 to these items immediately delivers (84),
VzA + Vuc,Jt,y + Vucn.fi t = ^t-l«t-l
 + ^ + V^C^ ~ Wf). (84)
2. To loglinearize (81), use rule 3 to obtain
at = atut + (1 - at)lr
With rule 4, extended to two arguments, and applied to ut = u(c,n),
Ut = t«sAV
 +
 £».n,fir
Also with rule 4,
Interchanging expectation and differentiation, rule 4 delivers
e, = ^+J(1 - <«+l)Et(*t+1) + €,,t+1E,(c(+1#0)]. (85)
Combining and exploiting (77), one obtains equation (33), i.e.
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3. Taking logarithms of (83) delivers
dt=l't^ + x'r
For x\, rule 4 delivers
x^-vJQ-^M + tJJ-
For Vt_lf repeated application of rule 4 delivers
i;_2 = -K-v-i^ - Vx-Kt-iEt-iWJQ- ~ Z^t + ^^oil-
Combining and exploiting (78) delivers equation (33), i.e.
dt = M-J(l - *,,)[*, - E,.^)] + iqA[ctfi - EUcJ])
A.2 Scale Invariance and Balanced Growth
Scale invariance has a number of implications.
1. To save on notation, define cty = cj>cty, ct0 = <J>cf 0 and z£>f = (f>wf: these are part of the allocation $. Thus, equation (22) can be rewritten as
^L = _JaL (87)
Note that the right-hand side—which can be interpreted as the income
share spend on consumption of the young—does not depend on 4>.
Hence, the ratio of the two logarithmic derivatives iuct = €u c t(ct , nt) and 4 n i
 = ^U n ti^ty'
 nt) i
s independent of the argument ct .
2. Suppose that the income share spend on consumption of the young
is constant
(88)
wtnt
then
k,c,l = Vyk,ny (89)
We note that this condition will hold along a balanced growth path,
where indeed the income share should be constant.
3. Replace cty with 4>ct y in (22), and take the logarithmic derivative with
respect to 4> to obtain
0 = - Vucct - Vucnt— + 1/ (90)300 Bovenberg and Uhlig
or
0 = - Mw, + V.mJjT- + 1 (91)
u,n,t
across all values ct .
4. Suppose additionally, that (xuccf is constant over time and T] = |xucc(.
We can derive a semiclosed form for the utility function u(c,n), as is well-
known from the literature (see, e.g., King and Plosser [1989]). We pro-
vide the derivation here for the sake of completeness. Consider first the
case T] ¥= 1. Since JULKC C f is the (negative) logarithmic derivative of uc with respect to c, this implies log-linearity for uc,
log
 wc(<V
 nt) = d - *n)
 loS
 v(
nt) ~ *n log cty,
where the "constant" term (1 - iq)log v(nt), may depend on nt (and seems
to have been written in a rather complicated fashion, as this will turn out
to be convenient later). Rewrite as
and integrate to obtain
w(<v
 nt) =
 vn[
cy—
 +
 KM (
92)
where K.(nt) is an additional constant, possibly depending on nt. Differ-
entiating with respect to nt and comparing to (22) shows that K.(nt) = K
independent of nt as follows. Rewrite (22) for the allocation 4> as
4>zt>, = —
v'(nt) K'(nt)
v(nt)
 Ct'
y
Divide by 4> to see that the left-hand side and the first term on the right-
hand side do not depend on 4>, whereas the last one does, unless either
r\ = 1 or K'(nf) = 0. Since we assumed r\ =£ 1, K.(nt) must be a constant, in-
dependent of nt. The case r\ = 1 similarly yields
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Take the logarithmic derivative with respect to cj> and exploit (78) to find
V»uc,c,t = V-qJt+v (95)
6. Again for the nonstochastic case, the constant share condition at — at
can be rewritten as
where a, does not depend on <j>. Taking the logarithmic derivative with
respect to (f>, we establish
A.3 The Equity Premium
To relate the risk-aversion parameters to observables, one possibility is
that observed allocations are (nearly) optimal as far as intergenerational
risk sharing is concerned, and to calibrate the risk-aversion parameters
to observed market prices of risk. In our context, this means to observe
market prices of risk from young agents trading assets that pay off when
they are old.
Given an allocation which solves the social planner's problem, sup-
pose that the social planner contemplates transferring resources be-
tween periods using some asset a with return R"t+1. Since the allocation is
already optimal, the social planner must wish not to execute this reallo-
cation. Hence, it has to be the case that the asset pricing condition (26)
not only holds for Rt+1, but for the return R
at+1 as well, which might, of
course, coincide with Rt+V Recall the definition of the stochastic discount
factor mt+1,
X-V(EL
_
 t+1 \wt
Ct+\,o302 Bovenberg and Uhlig
The asset pricing equation (26) then implies
Et(mt+1R"t+1) = Et(mt+1Rt+l). (97)
Decompose R"t+1, ct+l0, tnf+1, mst+l into their predicted part and sur-
prise part,
t+1,0) = log (ct+1j + ct+v
GTf+1) = log(OTt+1) + VJt+1,
K+i) = log( mt+1) + mt+1,
with
0 = Et(R»t+1) = Et(ct+1) = Et(wt+1) = Et(mt+1),
We assume that the surprise parts are jointly normally distributed, con-
ditional on information up to and including t. Denote the standard de-
viations by, for example, (JRt+1 and crmt+1 and correlations denoted by,
for example, pm R t+r Define the Sharpe ratio, defined as the difference of
the log expected returns divided by the standard deviation of the log re-
turn.
Using a standard calculation (see Lettau and Uhlig [2002]), one can
show that
SR, = - PmAt+1<*m,+1 (99)
It is easy to see that, up to a log-linear approximation,
= iVx.t + lWq.t + l ~ !)
 + ^t + J^t + l ~ (M-^t + l^f + l
 + V'q.t + JCt + l.o'
Using the same calculation as for (99), one can then show that
For the specific funcational form of subsection 3.3, we thus obtain
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These equations are informative about measuring curvature parameters
of the utility specification. In particular, we see that if there is no surprise
longevity risk, xbt+1 = 0, then the risk premium is proportional to the
risk-aversion parameter v, the standard deviation crco t+1 of old-age con-
sumption c01+1, and the correlation pc 0 R (+1 of old-age consumption with the asset return.
In solving a social planner's problem and in characterizing the speed
of capital accumulation, the appropriate risk premium and thus, the ap-
propriate scarcity of capital to generate the required average return
ought to be taken into account.
A.4 Solving the Social Planner's Problem
A.4.1 Collecting the Equations
For reference, the social planner's problem solves the following set of
equations:
Mct,y, nt) = _ 3«(ct>y/ nt) dcty ' 3nt
Rt = AJ{Ztnl) + l-bt,
y \ I L \
mt
z'(at)-
T!Jt
at = u(c nt) + px H EA x
't + 1,0304 Bovenberg and Uhlig
We assume that preferences are given by (44). Define
s = Y^— (l-i?)
and note that
(102)
which turns out to be useful in some calculations below. Note that
^t,0
TIT. 1-V '
= rat
Thus the equations above become
yt
IT.
v'(nt)
\,y
Rt = AJ{Ztnt) + l-bt,
o
J3_
xt =
where the last two lines define xt and st.
A.4.2 Normalization
To turn this into a stationary system, the growing variables need to be
divided by the beginning-of-period capital level kt_r Thus, letPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 305
*»-/
1,0 7
w.
r. - Vt
J.-A
1 k '
except that we define
a= —
s, =
The exponent differs here in order to achieve the appropriate scaling for
these utility variables. Moreover, we scale st by k]~^ rather than by k
vtz\
because that way, st_x (rather than sf_1 and kt_^) turns out to be the only remaining endogenous-state variable.
Rewrite the system as
Vt = Af(
zt
nt)'
c>, + ctfi + ktT:t = AJ{Ztnt) + 1 - 8f/
^ = _ v'(nt)
~
ct,y v(nt) '
Rt = AJ(Ztnt)306 Bovenberg and Uhlig
JL~-i
x=k\E(xn'
i c
n"
v )1
1/(1"
V
)
st = [(1 - t])atY^
wl-^-
vk
vt-^.
Note that indeed the only endogenous state variable remaining is st_v
A.4.3 Stochastic Assumptions
To make further progress, we need some additional, tractable assump-
tions. Let
A
IT,
(103)
be the vector of exogenous parameters. We assume that a steady state £
exists and that
I = log(Q - log(O
follows an AR(1) process,
i = ^it~i + ef (104)
for some 5X5 matrix N with nonexplosive roots, where
is the vector of innovations for each exogenous parameter andPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 307
AAA Steady State
The steady state for the tilde variables—which we shall now also use as
our benchmark values—is given by the equations
y = Af(Zn), (105)
STT + c0 + kv = Af(Zn) + 1-8, (106)
- - Z
w = Af{Zn)-=, (107)
w v'Cn)
— = —pf (108)
cy v(n)
R = Af(Zn)+ 1-1, (109)
;
vR exp -^ I, (110)
S XU C — 1^1 'H/^J u v\7l) , (111)
•=k\exp\^)w*cl-
v
 im~
V\ (113)
s = [(1 - •n)fl]<«-^
1-^
)^-
1']k
1'-«/ (114)
where cr
2R_vc denotes the conditional variance of log R(+1 + s log('GTf+1) -
v log(cf+10) and CT
2 is the conditional variance of s log wt+1 + (1 - v)log
We have included the risk terms in the intertemporal equations, thus
including a precautionary motive for saving. We implicitly assumed (as
remains to be shown in the log-linearized version), that the variances are
constant over time. This will be justified below, when solving for the lin-
ear recursive law of motion for the loglinearized system (see subsection
A.4.10).
Finally, define the argument share
(1 - y\)a
for T] =#= 1 and308 Bovenberg and Uhlig
1
a = 3
fornri = 1.
A.4.5 Solving for the Steady State
Labor supply (108) can be written as
wn
Cy
(115)
which says that the inverse of the share of wage income spent on con-
sumption when young is tied to £v(n). Labor demand (107) together with
(105) implies
-=— = t(Zn). (116)
y
 f
The labor share in production is thus closely related to the productivity-
weighted labor input Zn. Combining equations (115) and (116), one can
eliminate the wage rate w
TTCV UZn)
We also assume that variances and covariances are known: the under-
lying fixed-point problem will be discussed below. Equation (113) implies
x = K1kc0, (118)
where
The asset pricing equation (110), which can be viewed as describing op-
timal saving, can be rewritten with (118) as
c~^v(ny^ = K2c;^k^R, (119)
wherePension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 309
The risk-sharing condition (111) together with the definitions (114)
and (118) implies
(120)
which can be rewritten as
*
 cy
where
(121)
K, = 1 /P ..___
TT — K:
'TJT
1 / 3 W-
TT \ CO exp
V — T]
-v) 2
While (119) arises from an intertemporal savings decision, equation
(120) arises from the risk-sharing condition. The difference between
these two equations thus partially stems from the different weights
given to an agent currently alive or alive in the future due to population
growth and social planner discounting. Equations (119) and (120) with
(109) together imply
fc« = K4R = KA[Af{Zn) + 1-8], (122)
where
9 /R
2. I K —
K4 = : = w exp —-
which sheds light on the relationship between growth of the economy k
and required labor n versus the discount factor of the social planner GO
and a term exp(o-^_vc) related to the risk premium. Note also that
The right-hand side of (106) equals R. Use (105) to rewrite (106) as
c \ 1 — S — Tr
=!r =1+
j Af(Zn)
(123)
Combining equations in TTCV/\/, col~Ti~cy, k, and n, we have310
y \
c0 \ + ™J
VCy
y
Co
1 - 8 - TT fc
AflZn) '
£f(Zn)
— K 1c (€~
TiV
TW*7'V
Ti~
1)
/if
l
Bovenberg and Uhlig
(124)
(125)
(126)
fc« = K4R = K4[A/(Zn) + 1-8]. (127)
Substituting the second and third equation into the first to eliminate
Ttcy/y and cj^cy, one obtains
1 -8-irJt
[1 + K^^-^^^n)^"
1'^] = 1 +
3 A/(Z
£f(Zn)
II + K-K^-w^vin)™-
1"^ = n
Af(Zn]
Finally, use the fourth equation (127) to eliminate k to obtain
(1 + K3{K4[A/(Z7I) + 1 - BH^-^/^n)^-
1)^) (128)
1 - 8 - ^F{Z
This is a single and nonlinear equation in n. Solving it requires a specifi-
cation for v(-) and/(-). A solution may perhaps be given in special cases,
but numerical methods must be used generally. There may be multiple
solutions n> 0, indicating a multiplicity of steady states. Given a solution
to this equation, all other steady state variables can then be calculated.
A.4.6 A Parameterization
We shall assume that
v{n) = v—
i-x
with 0 < x < 1/ so that
T
1 - n
X 1 - nPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 311
Thus, (115) can be rewritten as
w(l — n)
cy
= 1 - X. (129)
The expenditure ratio of leisure over consumption when young is thus
given by 1 - x-
Further, we assume that
f{x) = [0 + (1 - 0)xi-a/*)]V[i-(i/w (130)
with 0 ^ 0 < 1 and \\s > 0 (where one should note that we usually use x =
Zn as argument), and thus
e
For i|i —> 1, this becomes
fix) = x
l~» (131)
Proof. Let e = 1 - (l/i|/). Nofe ffezf
log/(x; e) = - log{l + (1 - 6)[exp (e log x) ~ 1]}
— (1 - 6)[exp(elogx) - 1]
«i(l-e)(elogx)
= (l-0)logx,
which delivers the claim.
Either directly or per i|/ —»1, one then gets
€,(*) = 1-6,
\if(x) = 6.312 Bovenberg and Uhlig
A.4.7 A Special Case
We now analyze the case \\s = I, £, = T]-> 1,8=1 per successively inves-
tigating the implications of each additional restriction.
For the special case i|/ = 1, replace in equation (125) to get
and in equation (128) to find
1-X
(132)
1 - 8 -
For £; = r\ —> 1, the ratio of old-age consumption to young-age con-
sumption is given by (126) as
cc _ 3
Furthermore, for ^ = nq —> 1, one obtains
1 \ (1 - 6) / 1 - 8 \
1 h r(l + •<,) = (1 - ¥K4) 1 + = . (134)
-x) \ AZ^n
1-*) n
With complete depreciation (i.e., 8=1), this becomes
n —
(i-x)
'
5 (1 - 6) (135)
where
C 1 - if K,
i 1 if K,
-=r = K5 =
 i. (136)
y
 5 1 + K3
A closed-form solution is thus available in this case. Ignoring the vari-
ance and risk premium terms or assuming a nonstochastic steady state,
we can write K5 as
1 - mo
+ e(™>-'
 (137
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so that (by substitution into [136]),
(138
)
where one can now investigate the impact of a variety of parameters on
the steady state.
A particularly simple case is P = co and TT = 1. Ignoring the variance
and risk premium terms, one has
(139)
Cy
y
n =
Co
y
[••
i-
2
(1-
2
i
3) (l
(1
-x)"
-0)
with the gross-investment-to-GDP ratio (IT k)/y given by £.
Given a value of n, equation (127) shows that the growth factor k of the
economy and the level of total factor productivity A are closely related.
Varying the latter will not affect n under full depreciation in case £ = r\
—> 1, as shown above. Thus, to obtain an economy with a growth factor
k, we can set
-_ *
~ (
where we once again ignore the variance and risk premium terms.
These calculations also help in a somewhat more general case. For
suppose, alternatively, that 8=1, but that £ =£ T\ # 1. Use the solution n
of equation (135), but without imposing T| = 1 for calculating K5, that is,
using (136) to back out the level parameter v in the disutility of the
young consistent with this steady state
o = {K4[A(Zn)
1-
e + l-8]}
1
i-x
This may be useful in order to investigate local comparative statics
around a known steady state or to find an initial point for numerically
calculating the steady state.
A.4.8 Loglinearization
We now use hats on variables to denote the loglinearization of the de-
trended variables around the detrended steady state, for example,
Ct,y
 =314 Bovenberg and Uhlig
Furthermore, and from here onward and in slight abuse of notation, let ^
and iv be the logarithmic derivatives of/(•) and v{-), and \x,f and IJL^, the
(negative) elasticity of/'(-) and v'(-), all evaluated at steady-state employ-
ment n for v(-), respectively Zn for f(-). The loglinearization is given by
yt = At + tf{Zt + nt), (140)
(141)
(142)
(143)
(144)
ht) + Zt- Ht,
1-T,
- a)| kt + E
-k,
where we replaced xt everywhere with
A.4.9 Preparation for MATLAB Implementation
(146)
(147)
(148)
(149)
In order to implement this system of equations, it is more convenient to
use 8* = 88{ - since this is already in percent anyways and to handle 8 =
0 as limit - as well as a* = [(at/(l - r\)]. Write the system asPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 315
(150)
f) — P D _ f 7^(r A- TT\ — 7 r — ICTT (k 4- IT ^ H ST^
U — I\i\j ''u" V'fv t/ o to /vTT^/V-, r TT.^, ^ICly
0 = At - ix^Z, + nf) + Zt - TT( - w>t, (152)
0 = yyt - 8* - i^Kt, (154)
7 I 7-1 / ^ *"• 1 n \ 1 ^ /"i \ /? ^ /*i r~/^\
— I|/v. ~ iL^ 1| UJ^_|_2 I f+1 o f+1/ I f v V \) v i* \ ^^/
(157)
= (? ~ in)(
fl* ~ ^J ~
 st + (^ ~
 v)£jl ^j tBt+i
+
 c<+i/0 ]• (158)
In order to incorporate the generational account perspective, we also
add the equations
cy k ,
to capture the movements in the ratios of lump-sum taxes to wage earn-
ings to be paid by the young, expressed in percentage (rather than in
percentage deviation from the steady state of this ratio).
As state variables we choose st,cty,ct0, a*, and k. The first three come
in due to the insights from some analytic calculations toward deriving
the law of motion in closed form, available as a technical appendix in a
working paper version, and are to have three rather than one equation
containing expectations. The variable af has been added in order to
avoid potential difficulties of a purely algebraic nature in the special
case £ = r\. Finally, k has been added as a state to recalculate the impulse
responses for the non-normalized variables, if so desired.
A.4.10 The Recursive Law of Motion
We wish to solve for the linear recursive law of motion,316 Bovenberg and Uhlig
h = 9wst_i + *,£ (159)
ko = <PcoJt-l
and so forth: that is, we wish to solve for the coefficients <p(. s) e di and cp(. ?) G 3t
5 such that the linear recursive law of motion satisfies the loglin-
earized equations. Note that the linear recursive law of motion implies
that the conditional variances and covariances are constant and given
by, for example,
In particular, the Sharpe ratio (100) can now be calculated.
In principle, this involves the calculation of a fixed point: the steady
state requires knowledge of these variances and covariances, which can
be calculated, given the linear recursive law of motion. But the latter is a
solution to system of equations whose coefficients depend on the steady
state. An iterative procedure typically works well. As a first step, as-
sume these variances, covariances, and the Sharpe ratio to be zero, in
which case one obtains the nonstochastic steady state. Use it to generate
the loglinear approximation and solve it for the recursive law of motion.
Calculate the implied variances and covariances, and use them to recal-
culate the steady state, and so on.
This procedure was used, for example, Canton (1997, 2002) in a dif-
ferent context. The procedure typically converges fast. In fact, a single
step typically often suffices for all practical purposes. For that, use the
nonstochastic steady state to generate a linear recursive law of motion
and use the latter to calculate variances and covariances.
A.5 A Closed-Form Solution
We shall now provide a closed-form solution for the recursive law of
motion, given the loglinearized system. The procedure follows the
methodology explained in Uhlig (1999). We proceed in three steps. The
first two steps concentrate entirely on calculating the deterministic law
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system of three equations in st, cty, and ct0, and their leads and lags.
Plugging in the recursive law of motion, we obtain a system of three
equations in the three coefficients <pcys, <pcos, and cpss, which we reduce to
a quadratic equation in cpss and solve in the second step. With the solu-
tion to the deterministic part at hand, we proceed to calculate the coeffi-
cients on the stochastic part by solving a linear system of equations in
the third step.
A.5.1 Step 1: Reducing the System
Due to linearity, the solution to the deterministic part is obtained by
solving the loglinearized system under the assumption that all shocks
are equal to zero, that is,
yt = £fnt (160)
t = Af{Zn)€fnt (161)
wt=-\Lfht (162)
c,,= -(m+ *,)«, (163)
RRt = Af(Zn)£fnt (164)
-nfe( - r\cMi0 + Rt+l (165)
(167)
- (T, - v)cf+10 (168)
The first equation (160) is not needed for the reduction. Use the third and
the fourth equation (162), (163) to express nt in terms of ct . Use that in the
second equation (161) to express kt in terms of ct and ct0, in the fifth
equation (164) to express Rt in terms of ct , and in the seventh equation
(166) to express at/(l - r\) in terms of ct , ct 0 and ct+l 0,318 Bovenberg and Uhlig
1 — T|
where
A
Ky
Ky = <
1
^ + *v - IJ
Af(Zn)£f
Z/(Zn)€f
R
k
) + (l-c
efl£oc
i)efcv
Use these results in the remaining sixth, seventh, and ninth equation
(165) (166) and (168) to obtain
0 = Ky
Cty +
 0iAo + Kzy^y + ^JJM0
0 = -s( + 63/^ + 63oct 0
where
^,y = T\-tt-T\KKy-T
Ko = -T\\oPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 319
A.5.2 Step 2: A System of Three Coefficient Equations
Use the deterministic part of the recursive law of motion
ky
 =
to replace all variables except st_r For variables dated t + 1, this requires
plugging in twice. Comparing coefficients (or, equivalently, dividing by
sf_a) yields
0 = KVcys + KoVco*
 +
 0lEy
CPsS
CPcyS + KEO^S^COS
0 = -<PS,S + hy*cy,s + %,o<Pco,s + hEo%,sKs
Multiply the second equation with 03£o and the third with -62Eo, add
and solve for <pcys,
<p =6+0 <p + 0 <p . (171)
TCj/,s
 vcy "cy,sTS,s ™cy,cciTco,s' \*'
 x/
where
e =
3,£o
Cy,S A A A A
3,£o 2,0
Use that in the first two equations to replace cpcys/
o = e4 + 04/S<PS,S + e4/Ocpcos + e4sscps
2s + 9^9^ (172)
0 = % + K*s*
 + ho%os + %so%sVcos320 Bovenberg and Uhlig
where
4 =
 eiA
= A A
4,s
 Dl,y°cy,s
= A A
4,ss °l,£y°cy,s
A ft
4,S0 -
 yi,Ey
Ucy,C
5 = e2 A
A A
5,S -
 y2,y
ycy/S
Multiply the first of these two equations with 65 so/ the second with -64 so, add and solve for cpcos/
where
6 _ 4
co,s ft
e
coss
Use this to replace <pco s in either of the two equations of (172). We use the
second equation and obtain
o = es + ew<Pw + e.vpj, + es#MB<p^ (174)
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Equation (174) is a polynomial of third degree, which generally has
three roots, <pw., i = 1,2,3, and for which closed-form solutions are avail-
able. If only one of these roots is stable, that is, less than 1 in absolute
value, then this is the root we use. If there are more than one stable root,
then an additional-state variable is needed as generally would be neces-
sary to solve the system (172). If there are no stable roots, the system is
explosive, and our baseline assumption that there is a stationary solu-
tion to the social planner's problem in the detrended variables is unjus-
tified.
Experimentation with reasonable parameter choices has only deliv-
ered the case of a single stable root. We shall therefore concentrate on
that case from here on. Thus, let cps s be that solution.
The other two key coefficients, cpcos and <p , can now be found from
equations (173) and (171).
For the remaining variables we have
<P«,s
 =
 e»,y
<P,
n,y>cy,s (175)
where cpflS is the feedback coefficient for at,
We summarize these feedback coefficients per
' cy,s
'COS
(176)
^w,s
\ ' I322 Bovenberg and Uhlig
A.5.3 Step 3: Solving for the Coefficients on Exogenous Variables
Solving for the exogenous variables is now a matter of solving a linear
system of equations. In the equations (140) to (148), replace each en-
dogenous variable dated t with the feedback rule given in (159). The
variable sM stays as is. The variables dated t + 1 show up in expecta-
tions, and are replaced with the feedback rules as, for example, in
Et(
Ct+l,o) = EfacoA
 + <PoA+l)
where cpss and cpcos are now known, while we still seek to solve for cpco^. The resulting system contains coefficients on the variable st_v which
we already know to hold from the previous calculations. Let cp. ? be the
matrix of the to-be-solved-for feedback coefficients on the exogenous
variables £, given by
(
177)
where cpfl4 is the feedback coefficient for at/{\-V[). Take the feedback co-
efficients cp. s on st_a as given via the calculations above, and compare co-
efficients on the entries in t,t. By carefully examining the system or, al-
ternatively, exploiting the matrix algebra provided in Uhlig (1999), the
remaining system can be written in the form
Vvec(<p./C) = W
for some matrices Vand Wand the columnwise vectorization vec(cp. ?) of
the matrix of coefficients cp. r If N = 0—that is, if the exogenous variables
are i.i.d., then this can be written more conveniently asPension Systems and the Allocation of Macroeconomic Risk 323
(C<P J = D
In either case, one obtains a linear system in the entries of <p. c, which can
be solved under the usual conditions for invertibility. We shall skip the
tedious details on explicitely stating V and W or C and D.
A.5.4 Impulse responses
Define the vector of endogenous variables
0,1
K
wt
at/(l - i
i
With the above solution, one can now determine the effect of a shock
80 recursively per
r=p ,ij, = (p r (178)
and so forth, where, for example, (i)io)s is the first entry (corresponding to
s0)ofi|i0.Comment
HenningBohn, Department of Economics, University of California Santa
Barbara, and CESifo
Bovenberg and Uhlig examine risk sharing in a stochastic overlapping-
generations model. Their approach is in many ways similar to my work
on the same topic (Bohn 1998,1999,2001,2002,2003,2005), and they re-
produce several of my results. Like my papers, Bovenberg and Uhlig
examine a stochastic two-period OG model, they log-linearize the con-
straints and first-order conditions, and they maximize an ex ante mea-
sure of welfare. There are three main differences: assumption about
technology, assumption about intertemporal substitution, and model-
ing style. While Bovenberg and Uhlig assume AK production, I assume
constant returns to scale. They assume an elasticity of intertemporal
substitution greater than one (1/T| > 1), whereas I examine the entire
range and focus on values below 1. They start with a general model and
then consider special cases, whereas I tend to focus on basic benchmark
specifications and then generalize.
Bovenberg and Uhlig's main new finding concerns the optimal re-
sponse to an unexpected permanent increase in longevity (finding num-
ber 3 in the abstract). In Bovenberg and Uhlig's model, the optimal re-
sponse is to shift resources toward future consumption at the expense of
current workers and current retirees. Capital investment increases,
worker consumption declines, and retiree consumption per time unit
declines so much that total retiree consumption declines. That is, retirees
consume less over an unexpectedly long retirement period than they
would have consumed otherwise. Bohn (2001,2005) examines the same
longevity shock in a similar two-period OG model. While worker con-
sumption and retiree consumption per time unit also decline in my
model, total retiree consumption increases and there is no significant
change in capital investment. As I will explain, Bovenberg-Uhlig's result
is due to endogenous labor combined with a high elasticity of intertem-
poral substitution. While I agree that endogenous labor has importantComment 325
ramifications, the high elasticity of intertemporal substitution seems
counterfactual.
This comment has three parts. Part 1 provides an economic intuition
and interpretation of the new result on longevity. Part 2 comments on
other findings and how they relate to prior work. Part 3 raises some
broader risk-sharing issues.
5.A.1 The New Result on Longevity Shocks
Bovenberg-Uhlig's most striking result is the decline in total retirement
consumption in response to a longer retirement period. In their bench-
mark calibration, the elasticities of young-age (= worker) and of total
old-age (= retiree) consumption with respect to the longevity shock vit
are:
<Pcy,CT = -0.93 and cpcoro = -0.39,
respectively (see table 5.4, col.l). Because total old-age consumption is
proportional to jnt, the implied elasticity of old-age consumption per
time unit is even more negative:
d In (C/VJ)
°' = (p^ -i = -1.39 « o.
The reduced consumption yields an increased capital stock, as con-
firmed by the positive elasticities with respect to capital growth; for ex-
ample, cpgrowtlw = 1-25 in col.l.
1
What explains these results? How general are they?
Bovenberg-Uhlig's explanation centers on increased marginal utility
in old age that motivates higher returns on savings and makes it more
attractive for the social planner to shift resources in the future (see sec-
tion 4.6.7). This argument is difficult to follow because in the AK model,
savings triggered by higher marginal utility in old age do not change the
return on capital. In a model with decreasing returns to capital, the re-
turn would even decline.
A better intuition is to start with the observation that when the old live
longer, a social planner will want to redistribute resources from young
to old. For the young, the negative income effect increases labor supply.
Because the shock is permanent, labor supply is also expected to in-
crease in the future. In turn, more labor input increases the expected re-
turn to capital—not only in the AK model, but in any model where cap-
ital and labor are complements in production. As a result, the return to326 Bohn
capital rises above the social planner's discount rate. The planner will
want to implement an upward sloping optimal consumption path. An
upward-sloping path must start at lower initial consumption to remain
feasible. This line of argument matches the shape of the impulse-
response functions in figure 4.5.
The key step in this argument is the link between higher labor supply
and a permanently higher growth rate. In growth theory, this link is
known as the scale effect (see Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, ch. 4, for a
textbook exposition.) The scale effect is a general feature of AK models,
but unfortunately is inconsistent with empirical evidence (Jones 1995).
It's regrettable that the scale effect is built into Bovenberg-Uhlig's anal-
ysis and plays a role in their main result.
2
Can the AK assumption be relaxed to avoid scale effects? And does
the argument generalize to less persistent longevity shocks?
To examine these questions, consider a more general production func-
tion, though with somewhat simplified preferences. For production,
suppose
with 0 < 0 < 1 and Qk e (0,1). This includes Bovenberg-Uhlig's AK-
specification for Qk = 1 (their f(nt) = n}~
e case). For Qk e (6,1), returns to
scale are increasing, but returns to capital are decreasing. For 0fc = 0, one
obtains constant returns to scale—Cobb-Douglas production.
For preferences, assume power utility with risk aversion parameter TQ
> 0 and assume v(n) = v • (1 - n)
x~
x/{l - x). These preferences are less flex-
ible than Epstein-Zin utility; but unlike Bovenberg-Uhlig, I allow risk
aversion to be above one.
3 Let the longevity shock jnt follow a Markov
process with AR-parameter 0 < <pCTTn < 1, which nests permanent and
temporary shocks. For brevity in this comment, abstract from all other
shocks, set 8=1, and assume zero population growth.
The optimal fluctuations of capital, consumption, and labor around a
steady state follow a vector Markov process with state vector (kt, vjt).
(See the Appendix for all derivations and proofs.) The dynamics are
fairly straightforward: if one substitutes out labor and young-age con-
sumption, the dynamics of capital and old-age consumption are similar
to a representative agent model with preference shocks. Longevity acts
like a shock to marginal utility. Following Bohn (2003) and Campbell
(1994), one can log-linearize the resource constraint and the first-order
conditions analytically to obtain closed-form solutions for impulse-Comment 327
response coefficients (the (p-values). For AK-technology (dk = 1), the
process for capital has a unit root: <pf fc = 1. For Qk < 1, the process for cap-
ital has a stable root 0 < <pjfc < 1 under modest parametric restrictions.
Most importantly, one can obtain closed-form solutions for the re-
sponses to longevity shocks. For capital and old-age consumption, the
responses have the form:
I] _ _
<p = 1 - q>0 - <pt • <pKm (1)
where bl >l,bo> (k/F)(b1 -1) > 0,0 < <p0 < 1, and cpa > 0 are known func- tions of model parameters.
Bovenberg-Uhlig report that for all their numerical calibrations, total
retiree consumption declines in response to longevity (that (pco w < 0). The
analytical solutions provide general conditions under which these re-
sults apply. For AK-technology and unit-root shocks, one can show:
Observation 2: If Qk = 1 and(pCTra = 1, <pCOTO<0 holds if and only if (l/nr|)(/c/
F) > 1 + (cy/F){Q + [n/(l -nj]/(l - 6)}.
Because the expression on the right exceeds 1, r\ < (k/F) < 1 is a neces-
sary condition for cpco TO < 0; and r\ > (k/F) is sufficient for cpco m > 0. A neg- ative response of old-age consumption to longevity thus requires a suf-
ficiently low risk-aversion parameter, or equivalently, an elasticity of
intertemporal substitution exceeding l/(k/F) > 1.
More generally, for all 6^ < 1 and <pTO/nj < 1, (1) implies:
Observation 2: The sign of ipk w is determined by b1 • <pTO m -1.
Because fox > 1, Bovenberg-Uhlig's assumption of <pTOTO = 1 always en-
sures a positive capital response—regardless of other parameter
choices. In general, a positive response of capital to longevity requires
(prara > {1/bJ, that is, relatively persistent longevity shocks.
Observation 3: cpcora < 0 holds if and only if <pfc/fD. > (1 - (Po)/^ > 0; and <pfc/nr
>0 implies (pC0TO<l.
A positive response of capital to longevity (<pfc/tST > 0) is thus sufficient for
a decline in old-age consumption per time unit, but not sufficient for a de-
cline in total old-age consumption.328 Bohn
One can also show that a model with inelastic labor supply (no disu-
tility) has solutions of the same form as (1), but with bl — l. This implies:
Observation 4: With inelastic labor supply, permanent longevity shocks
(<pww = 1) imply (pfcTO = 0 and 0 < cpcora < 1. That is, capital remains un- changed, total old-age consumption increases, and consumption per
time unit declines.
Observation 4 reconciles the analysis here with the fixed-labor cali-
brations in Bohn (2001, 2005). With fixed labor, reduced worker con-
sumption (one can show cpcy OT < 0) does not trigger higher future labor
supply and therefore no increase in the return to capital. This eliminates
the planner's incentives to increase the capital stock and to reduce cur-
rent consumption. Hence there is no investment response. Retiree con-
sumption increases overall but decreases per time unit.
Bovenberg and Uhlig's significant contribution is to demonstrate the
importance of endogenous labor supply in this context: Persistent
longevity shocks imply a higher capital stock whenever the labor supply in-
creases. For the consumption results, the necessity of a high elasticity of
intertemporal substitution (EIS) is troubling, however. Empirical evi-
dence suggests EIS values well below 1 (Ogaki and Reinhart 1998, Hall
1988). Unless one assumes a high EIS in addition to elastic labor supply,
the results for consumption are qualitatively the same as in a fixed-labor
model. Because the expressions in (1) are continuous in Qk, observations
about AK also apply to production functions with 0fc-values slightly less
than 1.
Bovenberg and Uhlig argue that longevity is not valued unless one as-
sumes 1/T| > 1. This argument is unconvincing. First, the value of life is
irrelevant with exogenous longevity. Second, one could easily add terms
involving "TST, • (large weight)" to the utility function, which would
leave marginal utility unchanged while making absolute utility increas-
ing in longevity. The optimal allocation of consumption depends only
on marginal utility, not on absolute utility.
In summary, the key assumption for Bovenberg and Uhlig's results on
longevity is a high elasticity of intertemporal substitution. It makes the
social planner willing to shift resources from current to future genera-
tions whenever the return on capital differs from the planner's rate of
time preference. Though AK technology facilitates intertemporal shifts
in resources, it is neither essential for the results nor appears necessary
for tractability.Comment 329
5.2 Some Known Results
While I much appreciate Bovenberg-Uhlig's references to my work,
links to the substantive results may be helpful to readers. In their ab-
stract, Bovenberg and Uhlig highlight two findings:
1. The old typically bear a larger burden of the risk of productivity sur-
prises, if old-age risk aversion is smaller than life risk aversion, and vice
versa.
2. [The] consumption of the young and the old always move in the same
direction, even for population growth shocks.
Finding (1) was first derived in Bohn (1998) in a very similar setting—a
two-period stochastic OG model with Epstein-Zin preferences that al-
low for age-dependent risk aversion. The implications of age-dependent
risk aversion are also discussed in Bohn (2003) in a habit model, and re-
viewed in Bohn (2005). The section on efficient allocations in Bohn (1998)
concludes with:
Thus, an allocation that imposes more productivity risk on the young than on
the old can be rationalized by preferences with age-increasing risk aversion. The
old and the young should bear consumption risk in proportion to their risk tol-
erances. (Bohn 1998, p.18)
4
With regard to finding (2), Bohn (2005) states that
Efficient risk sharing has... implications that are robust to differential risk aver-
sion. Most importantly, everyone should be exposed to aggregate risk in the
same direction. (Bohn 2005, p.10)
The context is a discussion of aggregate risks that include population
growth shocks, longevity shocks, productivity shocks, and depreciation
shocks.
Bohn (2001) examines a broader range of demographic shocks and de-
rives conditions under which young and old should respond equally or
unequally to demographic shocks. I distinguish not only permanent
from temporary shocks, but also shocks revealed contemporaneously
from anticipated demographic shocks. The timing matters because chil-
dren are born about a generation before they start to work. Hence shocks
to the labor force are known a generational period in advance. Contem-
poraneous shocks like Bovenberg-Uhlig's population growth shocks are
better interpreted as shocks to the survival rate of children into adult-
hood.330 Bohn
Regarding policy questions and decentralization, Bohn (2003) pres-
ents decentralization in terms of Generational Accounting, as adopted
in Bovenberg-Uhlig's section 5. Regarding the "future work" proposed
on p. 41, note that effects of pension reform on the equity premium are
examined in Bohn (1997) and welfare implications of pension equity in-
vestments are examined in Bohn (1999). I find that the impact of plaus-
ible pension reforms on the equity premium would be non-zero, but
very small, and that pension-equity investments can be Pareto improv-
ing if the gains are appropriately allocated.
Bovenberg and Uhlig do not log-linearize the model around its deter-
ministic steady state—the common approach in macro—but around the
mean values of a stochastic steady state. This is sketched out in sections
5.4.2 and Appendix 5.A.3. My interpretation of these sections is based on
Bohn (1999), which used the same linearization method to examine the
equity premium and the ramifications of social security investment poli-
cies. As explained therein, the issue is not only the equity premium, but
also precautionary savings. The point of linearization is inessential for
most other purposes; that is, a simpler linearization around the deter-
ministic steady state would suffice (i.e., in terms of K3, K4, defined on
p.27, the limiting case of zero variances).
The point of this section is not to question Bovenberg-Uhlig's origi-
nality, but to suggest that their contributions are different. They provide
a flexible, all purpose specification that simultaneously includes many
elements that in previous work were modeled one at a time. Bovenberg-
Uhlig's framework and programming algorithm are therefore ideal for
finding interactions and linkages that were previously missed. Their
analysis of longevity shocks exemplifies this strength: the possibility of
declining total retiree consumption arises only in a generously parame-
terized model that allows the responses of several variables to interact
and to reinforce each other.
In the same spirit, I suspect that Bovenberg-Uhlig's framework has
rich and yet unexplored implications for the propagation of shocks. As
explained in Bohn (2003), optimal risk sharing in an OG production
economy has two parts. One part is static and involves optimal risk shar-
ing between currently living cohorts. The other part is dynamic and in-
volves the optimal propagation of shocks, which is the sharing of risk
between current and future generations. Bovenberg-Uhlig's main tech-
nical innovation—the use of AK-technology—relates to capital accu-
mulation, that is, to the model's propagation mechanism. The model
should therefore deliver new insights about how risk is allocated overComment 331
time. Static issues—ones dealing with current generations—deserve
less attention, because analysis in this area is more likely to rediscover
old results than to find new ones.
5.3 Problems of Intergenerational Risk Sharing
Bovenberg and Uhlig's paper has a clear normative focus: what is the
optimal policy? Normative answers naturally trigger positive ques-
tions: how do empirically observed fiscal policies compare? Can we
think of actual government policy as facilitating intergenerational risk
sharing? The answers appear to be disappointing, unfortunately, per-
haps even puzzling.
The main puzzle regards productivity risk, a major source of long-run
uncertainty. Retirees tend to be less exposed to productivity risk than
workers in market allocations (Bohn 2003,2005). If old and young have
equal relative risk aversion, they should be about equally exposed. Em-
pirically plausible policies tend to protect retirees against risk, for ex-
ample, by issuing safe debt and promising low-risk public pensions.
Such policies magnify the underlying imbalances in risk exposures be-
tween retirees and workers. They are efficiency reducing unless retirees
are substantially more risk averse than workers.
Can one argue that retirees are in fact more risk averse than workers?
Regrettably, the OG model does not provide testable evidence. The risk
aversion of the youngest cohort (or "life-risk aversion") is unobservable
by construction. Economists usually infer preferences parameters from
market actions—for example, the risk aversion of savers from portfolio
choices, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution from savings-to-
return responses, and the labor supply elasticity from leisure-to-wage
responses. This approach cannot be used for the risk aversion of the
young, because they cannot trade before they are born. Otherwise, their
risk aversion would presumably be reflected in their demand for insur-
ance. Moreover, if future workers could trade—say, as children, or par-
ents on their behalf—the policy problem would evaporate; policy
would become irrelevant/neutral. In summary, lifetime risk aversion is
a free parameter that makes the model difficult to test as a positive the-
ory of policy.
Because of the unobserved-parameter problem, I have moved away
from age-dependent Epstein-Zin preferences in Bohn (1998) to a habit
formation in Bohn (2003). Habit formation implies higher risk aversion
for the old than for the young, and it imposes more easily testable re-332 Bohn
strictions. I suspect habit formation would be straightforward to include
in Bovenberg-Uhlig's framework. I also believe the AK assumption
could be relaxed without much loss of tractability. Both extensions
would strengthen their paper's main contribution, which is to provide a
well-integrated and flexible framework for doing welfare analysis in
two-period stochastic OG models.
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Appendix: Derivations
Under the assumptions stated in the text, the planning problem is to
maximize
+ P * ™? • c]^)/{\ - Ti) subject toComment 333
ctfi ct+1 = F(kt/ nt) = fcf* • n]-
B (Ala)
where v(n) = v(l - nf-
x/{l - x), 0 < x < 1.
The first order conditions are
= (B • TS? • c;j (Alb)
v(nt)
 v
 A
/ 1-n,
A+i)] (Aid)
Adopting Bovenberg-Uhlig's notation of inverted hats for log-
deviations, log-linearizing (Ala-d) yields the following system of four
equations in the four main variables (young consumption, old con-
sumption, labor, and capital):
J —c
Ct/y
(01 I"
Qk • kt + (1 - 0) • iit
inf+1) + —(1 - 6k)fcf+1
(A2a)
(A2b)
-Kvn-nt (A2c)
6)nf+1 , (A2d)
where Kvn = [1 - (1/T|)](1 - x)[n /(1-n)]. If one substitutes out labor and
young-age consumption, the system reduces to two equations for capi-
tal and for old-age consumption:
', =
 Et\
•n 7 • - - TI
where Kcy = cy/F > 0, KC = (cy + co)/F> Kcy > 0, K6 = (l-0)/{6+Kvn + [n/(l-n)]},andKn - 1-6-KcvKvn/{d+Kvn + [n /(1-n)]}. Also define (KCO = Kc-Kcy>0.
Note that the same dynamics apply in a model with fixed labor supply
(no disutility: v = v), provided one replaces (A2c) by ht = 0 and imposes
Ktt = Ke = Oin(A3).
The rational-expectations solution for (ki+1, ct 0) follows a Markov pro-334 Bohn
cess with state vector (kt, tirt). Let {<pkJc, <pcok) and {<pk>m, cpco J denote the elasticities of the endogenous variables with respect to capital and
longevity, respectively. Matching coefficients in (A3), one obtains a pair
of equations for each pair of elasticities:
t +1(1-6.-6.-ok,
that characterize the propagation of shocks to capital; and
- et - efc • Ke) L J
characterize the responses to longevity shocks.
To simplify the algebra, define a more compressed notation for (A4):
ax^>co,k + a2Vk,k = «3 (
A6)
where ax = KC + Kn, a2 = 1 - KC, fl3 = (1 + Kn)Qk, ^ = [1 + (l/ti)Ke], b2 = (i/i,)(i-efc-efc-Ke).
Equations (A6) yield a quadratic equation for (pkk:
It is straightforward to verify that for O<0fc<l, this equation has a unique
stable (andpositive) root, denoted <p£fce (0,1),provided 0 + n/(l -n) +
KvfJ > 0. (P[0] = fl3 > 0 and P[°°] = °o are obvious. The main step is to ver-
ify P[l] < 0 for 0 < dk < 1, which implies one root in [0,1], the other in [1,
For Bk = 1, (A6) also applies and has solutions cp*fc = <p*oJt = 1. (One can verify P[l] = 0. Bovenberg and Uhlig instead transform the model into
stationary "capital-ratio" variables; this yields the same results as
shown below.)
Given <p*fc, one obtains (p*ok = (a3 - d2^Xk)l
a\ f°
r consumption. Note
that (<p*fc/ ip*ofc) are known functions of the model parameters.Comment 335
Continuing with general 0^. < 1, (A5) can be written more compactly
as
, / = ><cy - Kc = Kco < 0 (A7)
which implies
<P«,,- = 1 - ^ - %,„ = 1 - 9o - cpx • <fW (A9)
where fr0 = ^(frjtp* jt + b2) = bx(a3 - fl2cp*J + axbv 90 = *Jav and ^ = aj av Equations (A8) and (A9) match equation (1) in the text.
Note that fll = KC + (1 - 6 - KcyO/{0 + Kvn + [n/(l - n)]} = K9 + KCO + KCJ/{6 + [n/(l -n)]}/{6 + KVM + [n/(l-n)}\ > K8 + KCO^> 0and K9 > 0,pro-
vided 0 + n/(l -n) + Kvn > 0. Under this condition, <p0,9a > 0 and cp"0 < 1,
which implies Observation 2. The denominator in (A8) is declining in
cpOTTO. Hence, a positive sign of d1 = b0- a2(b1 - 1) ensures a positive de- nominator for all tpTO m. Writing
d, = «2(1 - b^y + b1(«3 - a2) + b2ax = a3/<p%k - a2bv
one finds d1 > 0 <=> a3/q>tk >
 fl2^i ^^ 'P**: < ^/(^I)- The latter is true be-
cause the two roots of P(cpfc k) = 0 multiply to a3/{a2b^) and the greater root exceeds 1. Thus, (A8) has a positive denominator. Observation 3 follows
because KCO > 0. For Observation 4, note that in a fixed-labor model, Ke =
0 implies bl — 1 and hence <pfcTiJ = 0 for <pTOTO = 1. For Observation 1, one requires a more detailed analysis of the condi-
tion
that ensures cpco m < 0. For simplicity, I focus on the AK-production case:
Lemma AV. Assume dk = 1 and cpTOTO = 1. Then cpcora < 0 holds if and only
if (l/<n)(*/F) > 1 + Kcy{0 + [n/(l - n)]}/(l - 0) > 1.
Proo/- 0fc = 1 and 9wra = 1 imply b2 - —(l/r|)Ke = l-b1 andd1 = al{b1 + b2)336 Bohn
From (A9), <pW/TO < 0 is equivalent to ax - KCO - a2 • <pkxa < 0, where <pkt -l)/dv Hence
<P«,W <
 0 « Ml <
 KJ
dl
 +
 fl2(&i - 1)1 =
 &0
Kco =
 fll
Kco <=>
 dl <
 Kco
&&^ = ax- a2{bx - 1) = (KC + Kn) - (1 - KC) — K9 < KCO
K +KB<(1~KC)—Ke Tl
e + K_ + -—- ' e + K vn 1 - n
 vn 1 - n
1 -n 1-
\-n
 vn 1 - n
n n
+ 0 + 1 - n i i 1 - n
^
 Kcy 1 ft
 < ^ ~
 Kc' ~ ^ 0- ~
Kc)
>
 Kcy \ a
+ 1 > 1, where 1 — KC = k/F.
QED.
Corollary: A necessary condition for cpco ra < 0 is a T| < 1 - KC < 1. That is, the
risk-aversion parameter is much less than the gross investment share in
output, which is less than 1. Equivalently, the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution must exceed 1/(1 - KC) > I.
5
Finally, one may verify that Bovenberg-Uhlig's transformed variables
(ct - kt, kt+1 - kt) yield the same results as the above derivations. Equa-
tions (A3) with 0j. = 1 imply the transformed system
(K 4- k- \(r — & \ -\- C\ — it
K - K - ^ =
 E\ I
1 + -
Ke )(ct+u ~
 fcf+i - ^t+i) I + (K+i ~ K)
Because the state vector is the single variable rBt, the solutions for (ct 0 -
kt, kt+1 - kt) are linear functions of inr Denote the slope coefficients by
(Vco-k.T,' Vgmwth.J-
 Fro
m (A10):Comment 337
r M/Trn-t \ r/ T crrr»\A7fVi V n/ n)
which yields cpgrowthro = KJ^JI + (1/TOKJ- 1}/(KC + Kn - (1 - Kc){cpwjl + (l/-n)Ke] " 1}), q^- = (1 - O/(KC + Kj - (1 - KC)/(KC + Kjcpgrowth^. For
0fc = 1, the denominator in (A8) reduces to the same expression as the
denominator in <pgrowth TO (see proof of Lemma Al). Comparing to (A8-9),
one finds cpgrowth,ro = %,«,
and <PC0_^ = <P«,,W-
Notes
1. For visual reinforcement, the impulse responses in figure 5.1 show that growth rises
persistently and that the capital stock grows exponentially relative to the baseline (linearly
in logs). According to figure 5.1, future consumption /capital ratios also decline, but be-
cause capital grows faster, future generations—beyond a transition period—will enjoy
higher and higher consumption levels in old age and in young age. Other columns in table
5.4 show even greater negative consumption elasticities.
2. Bovenberg-Uhlig select the "benchmark parametrization" so there is zero growth in the
initial steady state (see first paragraph of sec. 5.6.1), perhaps to avoid scale effects. This
does not solve the problem, however, because longevity shocks trigger permanent devia-
tions of growth form the steady state; that is, exponentially growing deviations in levels
that introduce non-zero growth.
3. As explained below, I am not persuaded by their argument for T|<1.
4. The term rationalized actually hints at a problem: the risk aversion of the young—which
Bovenberg and Uhlig call life risk aversion—is unobservable because individuals enter-
ing the economy are, by construction, unable to express their risk preferences through
prior market actions. Because of this problem, and to avoid non-expected utility, my more
recent work presents age-dependent risk aversion in terms of a habit model (Bohn 2003).
5. Bovenberg-Uhlig report <pco m < 0 in table 5.4 even though -r\ = 0.5 exceeds k/F « 0.4. This
suggests that more complicated conditions apply for Epstein-Zin preferences.Comment
Philippe Weil, EC ARES, Free University of Brussels, and NBER
1. Introduction
1.1 General Comments
The paper by Bovenberg and Uhlig represents an ambitious effort. Its
objective is to provide a quantitative characterization of optimal inter-
generational risk sharing in a world in which almost everything is ran-
dom (productivity, demography, longevity), and in which investment is
the engine of long-run growth (AK model). This analysis is carried out
in a log-linear framework, so that it is possible to precisely understand
the role of preferences and technology on the shape of the optimal pol-
icy mix.
1.2 General Caveat
One might wonder, at the outset, whether it makes sense to characterize
in such detail the optimal intergenerational redistribution while ne-
glecting the very real possibility that public schemes at least partly
crowd out, or substitute for, risk sharing within the family. The point is
not that one must jettison the overlapping-generations (OLG) model in
favor of a Ricardian alternative, but instead that one should at least ac-
knowledge that the risks affecting a cohort are, to some extent, shared
without public intervention inside altruistic families (e.g., the risk of be-
ing born disabled, or during a recession). So it should be clearly stated
that the view taken by this paper, and others like it, is no less extreme
than that of 100-percent Ricardian models. The latter assume all inter-
generational risk sharing is useless, the former that all intergenerational
risk sharing matters. The truth is obviously somewhere in between. Un-Comment 339
fortunately, we have little empirical evidence as to where we stand,
quantitatively, between these two extremes. This turns what should be
an empirical debate into an ideological argument, with the unfortunate
result that papers in the intergenerational risk-sharing literature usually
preach to those who are already converted.
2. Contributions of the paper
2.1 Related Literature
What does this paper achieve relative to previous literature?
• Relative to Bohn (2004): Bovenberg and Uhlig use Epstein-Zin-Weil
preferences, but Bohn (2004) already separated risk aversion from in-
tertemporal substitution using preferences exhibiting habit formation.
Bohn also examined the effect of age-dependent risk aversion, and of la-
bor-leisure choices.
• Relative to Krueger and Kubler: Bovenberg and Uhlig go beyond simple
pay-as-you-go systems, and compute optimal mix between defined ben-
efits and defined contributions, and funded/unfunded systems.
• Relative to Barbie, Hagedorn, and Kaul (2005): Bovenberg and Uhlig deal
with ex ante efficiency. This is similar to Bohn (2003).
• Relative to all: Bovenberg and Uhlig AK model. This enables them to
introduce a feedback from the work effort of young onto capital accu-
mulation and long-run growth.
2.2 Main Results
The paper shows that in an ex ante optimal allocation:
1. The consumptions of young and old move together.
2. The old bear a larger share of macro risk than the young if they are
relatively more risk averse.
3. Permanent aging of the population requires lower total consumption
of the old (and more work by the young, in order to increase savings,
and thus growth, in this AK model).
Results 1 and 2 are not surprising, as they follow from standard consid-
erations in the theory of efficient risk sharing. Result 3 is less intuitive340 Weil
(but see below for comments on the formalization of longevity adopted
in the model).
3. Intuition
Competitive equilibria in OLG models are generically not ex ante
Pareto-efficient, even in economies that are dynamically efficient. The
one notable exception, studied extensively in Blanchard and Weil (2001)
and Bohn (2003) is a simple Diamond model with logarithmic utility,
Cobb-Douglas production function, and full capital depreciation. I will
heavily draw on Blanchard and Weil (2001) to outline this model, as it
neatly illustrates the issues at hand.
3.1 Consumption
Suppose a typical member of generation t faces the problem of allocat-
ing an initial labor income Wf (which is random, but realized at birth) be-
tween young- and old-age consumption C11 and C2t+r She supplies one
unit of labor when young at the going wage rate Wt, and retires when
old. She maximizes
subject to the budget constraints
cu + st = wt,
where St is savings and Rt+1 denotes the gross interest rate between dates
t and f + 1. It is straightforward to show that the optimal consumption
of the young and old who are alive at time t is
(3.1)
(3.2)
so that
C WComment 341
3.2 Production
Suppose output at t is
Yt = AtK?N]-«,
where At is a productivity shock realized one instant before the birth of
generation t, and K and N denote the capital and labor inputs. Capital
fully depreciates in production, and firms maximize profits under per-
fect competition.
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium
Suppose population is constant and normalized to 1, so that Nt = l for
all t. In this economy, with full capital depreciation, clearing of the goods
market requires that the capital stock at the beginning of period t + 1
equal the savings of the young at t:
Kt+1 = St.
Using the first-order conditions for utility and profit maximization, this
implies that
Kt+1 = p(l - a)AtK?,
which is the standard (stochastic) difference equation characterizing the
dynamics of the capital stock in the Diamond model.
Since Rt — aAt Kp
1, this can be shown to imply that
RtWt, a =
(1 )P Wt (1 -
Therefore:
C2t
u
so that the consumption of the young and of the old are perfectly corre-
lated in the competitive equilibrium.
3.4 Optimality
One can show that, in this economy, the unconditional expectation of the
logarithm of the gross marginal product of capital is In 8. Thanks to Zilcha342 Weil
(1990), we know that in this example without population growth, the
condition In 0 > 0, that is, 0 > 1, entails dynamic efficiency.
It turns out that the condition 0 > 1 also entails ex ante Pareto optimal-
ity, since the competitive allocation then maximizes the social welfare
function
12/1 + 9)~
s[(l - P)ln Cu+S + 3 In
s=0
3.5 Generalization
The perfect correlation of the consumption of old and young is lost
when one departs from this simple/Cobb-Douglas model. But it is what
is required, as Bovenberg and Uhlig show, to guarantee ex ante opti-
mality—whence the role of Pareto-improving intergenerational risk-
sharing public policies (result 1). Were we to allow for different degrees
of risk aversion when young and old, we would obviously recover re-
sult 2, namely that optimal intergenerational risk-bearing requires that
the less risk averse bear more risk.
4. Longevity
4.1 Optimal Suicide
A fascinating issue arises in the paper as to the preference for longevity.
The easiest way to illustrate it is to consider the following simple ex-
ample.
Suppose that I have one unit of good to spend, and that I can choose
either to eat it all now and die right afterward, or to eat 1 /2 of it now and
1 /2 of it tomorrow.
Ignoring time discounting, and with a utility function q(-) over goods,
the former strategy yields utility q(l), the latter 2^(1/2). As a result, it is
optimal to live fast and furious rather than slow and easy (i.e., to commit
suicide young) if and only if
or, more generally, if the derivative of the function co^(l/co) with respect
to a) is negative.
To make sure this does not occur, the authors impose the restriction
that q{z) - zq'{z) > 0 for all z. This is a bizarre restriction, as it rules out,Comment 343
for instance, all isoelastic functions q(-) at least as concave as logarithmic
utility.
4.2 The Benefits of Living
The reason for this absurd parametric restriction is that the formaliza-
tion of preferences in the paper is incomplete in a crucial dimension that
is not orthogonal to the issue of longevity: the authors assume that the
old do not value leisure. As a result, it is neither pathological nor sur-
prising that agents may sometimes want to die young.
To avoid optimal suicide without imposing an ad hoc assumption on
the utility function, it suffices to assume that living longer is in itself
pleasurable (as we implicitly do when we assume that leisure is pleas-
urable per se). Call X > 0 the utility value of an extra period of time (net
of the extra hours spent in the gym to increase longevity). Then, living
fast and furious provides utility q(\) + X, while slow and easy yields utility
2*7(1/2) + 2\. As a result, it is optimal to die old provided that 2q(l/2) +
2k > q(l) + X, that is, when
To ensure that this condition is satisfied, there is no need to impose any-
more that the function (aq(l/oi) be decreasing in co. All that is required is
that \ be big enough.
I conclude from this simple calculation that the paper is missing a
more careful consideration of the costs and benefits of longevity. This is,
of course, the message of Hamermesh and Soss (1974), who quote
Schopenhauer's On Suicide:
... as soon as the terrors of life reach the point at which they outweigh the ter-
rors of death, a man will put an end to his life.
Until the authors present a more complete theory of endogenous
longevity, their results on the appropriate policy response to longevity
shocks should thus be taken with a grain of salt.
5. Conclusion
Before I wrap up this discussion, I would like to reflect briefly on the ex
ante efficiency criterion used in the paper. The debate between advo-
cates of ex ante and interim efficiency is not an academic argument but
an important policy debate. It rests on two main considerations:344 Weil
• The intergenerational transfers required by the more demanding ex
ante efficiency concept are in most cases not implementable in a democ-
racy. Hence there is no guarantee (in contrast with policies that imple-
ment interim efficiency) that future generations will respect the social
intergenerational insurance contract signed today to enforce ex ante ef-
ficiency.
• By contrast, the less ambitious interim optimal allocations can be im-
plemented by sophisticated, state-contingent, Ponzi schemes in which
agents take part voluntarily (Blanchard and Weil, 2001; Barbie et al.,
2003).
To sum up, this paper is a technical tour deforce. Despite all its ingredi-
ents, it remains tractable, which is a real feat. It suffers from an overly
terse formalization of the preference for longevity and lacks a discussion
of the appropriateness of the ex ante efficiency criterion. But it is fasci-
nating.
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